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The US has defined a number of critical infrastructures, the disruption of which 
“would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters”. Among these critical 
infrastructures are transportation networks, which enable the flow of people and 
commodities, and recent reports suggest that many highways, bridges, and other transit 
assets in the US fall short of a state of good repair, potentially threatening the efficiency 
of the network. In 2013, 55 million tons of goods valued at more than $49.3 billion 
traversed the US freight transportation system each day, and freight tonnage and 
monetary value rose by 6.3 and 8.0 percent, respectively, over 2007 levels. Over the next 
30 years, transportation’s contribution to the US gross domestic product is expected to 
grow to approximately $1.6 trillion. Given the potential for disruption by malevolent 
attacks, natural disasters, human-made accidents, or common failures, recent US planning 
documents focus on the criticality of transportation network preparedness. Emphasis has 
been placed on “securing and managing flows of people and goods” along transportation 
networks. The consequences of disruptions to critical infrastructures highlight the need 
to better understand resilience, or the ability to withstand the effects of and recover timely 
from a disruption. Particularly for critical infrastructures, the Infrastructure Security 
Partnership (2011) noted that a resilient infrastructure sector would “prepare for, prevent, 
protect against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant threat or 
event” and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and services with 
minimum damage and disruption.” As with any other critical infrastructure, resilience 
planning is important for multi-modal transportation networks due to their role in the 
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economic vitality of states, regions, and the broader country. The functionality of this 
network is threatened by disruptive events that can disable the capacity of the network to 
enable flows of commodities in portions of nodes and links. 
This research creates a new paradigm with which to improve decision making for 
freight transportation network sustainment through an integrated duple of resilience and 
interdependent economic impact. Integrating a multi-commodity network flow 
formulation with an economic interdependency model, driven by publicly available data 
from Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Department of Transportation, I have 
proposed a framework to quantify the multi-regional, multi-industry impacts of a 
disruption in the transportation network which has led to (i) defining a new measure of 
network component importance, (ii) planning for adaptive capacity through contingent 
rerouting, (iii) investing for absorptive capacity, and (iv) guiding network recovery and 
resilience. This work has been applied a multimodal freight transportation network in 
Oklahoma that connects the state to several regional trading states, enabling the flow of 
six important commodities that have interdependent effects on the Oklahoma economy 






INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
In response to the growing vulnerability of critical infrastructure given their 
exposure to natural hazards, malevolent attacks, and the challenges of aging, the 
Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21) 
(White House 2013) was established to focus national efforts to enhance the critical 
infrastructure network resilience.  
The Nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin 
American society. Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and 
maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure – including assets, 
networks, and systems – that are vital to public confidence and the Nation's safety, 
prosperity, and well-being.  
- Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (The White House 2013) 
Among the critical infrastructures defined by the US government are 
transportation networks, which are vital to a society and support many economic activities 
including commerce and tourism. Disruptions triggered by natural hazards, human-made 
events, or common failures can severely compromise a region’s ability to move people 
and commodities, consequently leading to irrecoverable economic losses as well as public 
safety concerns. Many recent large-scale examples highlight the growing need to deal 
with disruptions: Hurricane Sandy that affected multiple infrastructure networks, 
including downed power lines and massive flooding on New York and New Jersey 
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roadways and one million cubic yards of debris that impeded transportation networks 
(Lipton 2013); the August 2003 US electric power blackout that caused transportation 
network disruptions (Minkel 2008); and Hurricane Isabel that adversely impacted the 
transportation system of the Hampton Roads, VA region in 2003 and overwhelmed 
emergency response (Smith and Graffeo 2005). The current state of disrepair of the US 
transportation network (e.g., roads given an American Society of Civil Engineers 
Infrastructure Report Card grade of D, bridges a C+, inland waterways a D- (ASCE 
2013a)) could make the network especially vulnerable to a disruptive event. The situation 
is no better for the state of Oklahoma, where bridges in particular received a lower letter 
grade of D+, which by definition is interpreted as a “poorly performing” infrastructure 
(ASCE 2013b). Recent US planning documents focus on transportation network 
preparedness (The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 2013, US 
Department of Transportation 2014, Yusta et al. 2011), emphasizing “securing and 
managing flows of people and goods” along transportation networks (DHS 2014).  
The physical freight transportation network of the US, the largest in the world, 
consists of four million miles of public roads, 140,000 miles of railroad tracks, 11,000 
miles of navigable waterways, and a network of airports with the combined ability of 
shipping almost 68,000 tons of cargo per year (U.S. Department of Transportation 2013). 
Furthermore, the same document highlights the importance of the US transportation 
network in facilitating the convenient movement of resources among suppliers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and customers, with more than 300 million people and 7.5 
million organizations across 3.8 million square miles being served. The vital role the 
freight network plays in transporting raw materials and final products between 
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manufacturers and consumers highlights its position in commerce. The functionality of 
this network is threatened by disruptive events that can disable the capacity of the network 
to enable flows of commodities and cause an interruption of economic productivity across 
multiple industries. That is, the ultimate usefulness of understanding transportation 
network disruptions is not just a descriptor of physical damage, but of economic 
interruption due to infrastructure inoperability (Tierney 1997, Webb et al. 2000). As such, 
discussions of transportation network resilience should account for multi-industry 
impacts.  
This work focuses on the freight transportation network, particularly on its role of 
enabling the flow of commodities and facilitating economic productivity, and thus a 
methodological approach to measure network resilience in the context of multi-industry 
impacts is sought. That is, this work seeks to answer: how can we enhance freight 
transportation network resilience? This research addresses (i) measuring the vulnerability 
of a multimodal freight transportation network with multi-industry impacts in mind, (ii) 
using the vulnerability analysis to develop a measure of importance for each network 
component, (iii) planning for adaptive capacity, (iv) investing for absorptive capacity in 
critical infrastructures and industry sectors, (v) planning network restoration following a 
disruption. 
To model a supply-demand network for a set of business economic areas 
consisting of different industries interacting with their suppliers and customers located 
outside of their region through a multi-modal freight transportation system, a typical 
multi-commodity network flow (MCNF) model (e.g., Ahuja et al. (1993)) is used. The 
4 
 
goal of this model is to facilitate the commodity flows between suppliers and consumers 
through a capacitated transportation network while minimizing the cost of transportation. 
Planning decisions in a multi-modal freight transportation network is made at strategic, 
tactical, and operational levels (Crainic and Laporte 1997). It is assumed that (i) strategic 
decisions determine general development policies and define the operating strategies of 
the system over relatively long time horizons (e.g., the location of the physical 
transportation network, the location of main facilities such as rail yards or multi-modal 
platforms (Liotta et al. 2015)), (ii) tactical plans deal mostly with medium-term decisions 
(e.g., route choice and type of service to operate, aggregate scheduling (Kengpol et al. 
2012)), and (iii) operational level decisions are made when real or near real-time response 
is required (e.g., crew or container scheduling (Wang and Yun 2013)). 
Natural hazards, human-made events, or common failures could threaten the 
functionality of the network components and consequently interrupt commodity flows. A 
common theme in the analysis and evaluation of network vulnerability is interdiction 
(Gedik et al. 2014, Murray et al. 2008, Murray et al. 2007), in which scenario-based 
removal of network components is assumed to represent the effects of a disruptive event. 
The consequences of a targeted attack, accident, or natural disaster are simulated as 
disruptions in the flow of valuable goods or services through the network caused by 
disabling network components. The network is analyzed to determine how vulnerable it 
is to a disruption, and which nodes or links, if lost, result in the most damage to network 
performance. Further, the temporal and spatial scales at which analysis is conducted, as 
well as the duration of the disruptive event, affect the disruption analysis. 
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Approaches to interdict a network differ based on how disruption scenarios are 
assessed and understood. A disruption scenario is defined by the set of network 
components that are impacted, the degree to which they are disabled, and the operating 
conditions (e.g., network activity and link/node capacities) of the network prior to the 
disruption regardless of the initiating event that causes the disruption. In extreme cases, 
an affected facility may be rendered completely inoperable by a disruption (e.g., losing a 
road completely due to a bridge collapse as in the case of the I-35 Mississippi River bridge 
failure in 2007). In other instances, a disruption may impact network activity to a lesser 
degree given that only some of the functionality of a facility may be lost (e.g., an accident 
blocking a single lane of an interstate highway segment). The identification of disruption 
scenarios enables an impact assessment. Impacts can range from those directly associated 
with network operation, such as connectivity, flow, or capacity reduction, to more 
complex associations, such as the economic impacts affecting the production and 
consumption of flows (Matisziw and Murray 2009). 
The flexibility in defining scenario-specific disruptions based on historical data 
or other desired analysis makes it appropriate for network vulnerability studies. In 
particular, it provides opportunities for understanding a component’s role and importance 
within a network. For example, one might be interested in the impact of the closure of a 
bridge or a road segment on network performance (e.g., the flow of commodities, the 
topological behavior of a post-disruption network, the multi-industry economic impacts). 
A deterministic scenario-specific approach (Murray et al. 2008), where the potential 
ramifications of the removal of a particular network component is evaluated, is often used 
to quantify network component importance measures (e.g., Nagurney and Qiang 2008, 
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Jenelius et al. 2006). Stochasticity could be introduced to capture uncertainty in disruptive 
scenarios (e.g., Miller-Hooks et al. 2012, Burgholzer et al. 2013, Baroud et al. 2014).  
To model the interdependent adverse effect of commodity flow disruption on 
multiple industry sectors located in different regions, we use a multi-regional extension 
of Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM). The IIM is an extension of the traditional 
economic input-output model (Leontief 1986), a linear model of the commodity flows in 
a set of interconnected industries. A risk-based multi-regional interdependency model 
used to measure the economic impacts of a transportation disruption in terms of remaining 
commodities at suppliers and unmet demands at demand nodes. The input-output (I-O) 
model is a widely accepted model for analyzing the interdependent connections among 
industries (Miller and Blair 2009), and the use of the I-O enterprise for studying 
disruptions was among the 10 Most Important Accomplishments in Risk Analysis: 1980-
2010 (Greenberg et al. 2012). 
Despite of the I-O model’s assumption of a linear relationship of commodity 
flows among industries, the extensive usage of I-O models is due in part to the availability 
data describing the parameters of the I-O model in a number of countries (OECD 2011, 
Timmer et al. 2015). This includes a data collection effort by the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), which maintains input-output tables at different levels of aggregation 
(BEA 2010). Extending the capability of the I-O model, Santos and Haimes (2004) 
propose the Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM) to represent the propagation of 
inoperability, or the proportional extent to which industries are unproductive after a 
change in demand or a forced change in demand due to a lack of supply. The use of the 
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IIM can model inoperability in an economic setting, or in a set of interdependent 
infrastructures (Setola and De Porcellinis 2008, Crowther and Haimes 2010, Oliva et al. 
2014). The IIM and some extensions have been deployed in a number of contexts, 
including analyses of infrastructure disruptions (Anderson et al. 2007, Pant et al. 2011, 
2015, Jonkeren et al. 2015, Mackenzie et al. 2012), workforce losses (Orsi and Santos 
2010a,b), and supply chain risk (Barker and Santos 2010a,b), among others. Furthermore, 
the IIM has been used in multi-industry vulnerability studies (e.g., Yu et al. (2014) 
developed a multi-perspective approach for vulnerability decomposition with the aim of 
prioritizing key economic sectors in the aftermath of disruptive events).   
Several definitions of resilience have been proposed, including the ability to 
withstand, adapt to, and recover from a disruption, a definition with which many would 
largely agree (The White House 2011). Barker et al. (2013) highlight two important 
dimensions of resilience: (i) vulnerability, or the extent to which the performance of a 
system degrades after an initiating disruption, and (ii) recoverability, or the ability of a 
system to return to a desired performance level in a timely manner. These are similar to 
the concepts of robustness and rapidity in the resilience triangle literature (Bruneau et al. 
2003). Similarly, Vugrin and Camphouse (2011) defined the resilience capacity of a 
system as a function of: (i) absorptive capacity, or the extent to which a system is able to 
absorb shocks from disruptive events, (ii) adaptive capacity, or the extent to which a 
system can quickly adapt after a disruption by temporary means, and (iii) restorative 
capacity, or the extent to which the system can recover from a disruption or be 
reconstructed in the long-term. As such, absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities 
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can be viewed as first, second, and third lines of defense, respectively (Hosseini and 
Barker 2016). Figure 1.1 highlights the relationship between (i) vulnerability and 
recoverability and (ii) absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The relationship between (i) the vulnerability and recoverability 
dimensions of resilience and (ii) the components of absorptive capacity with 
respect to system performance 𝝋(𝒕). 
 
Following the introduction presented in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents a 
framework developed to measure the network vulnerability from the unique perspective 
of multi-industry impacts. The framework is illustrated with a case study considering a 
multi-modal freight transportation network consisting of inland waterways, railways, and 
interstate highways that connect the state of Oklahoma to other surrounding states.   
In Chapter 3, it is sought how investing in hardening both the infrastructure (e.g., 
backup equipment) and industries themselves (e.g., on-hand inventory) can lessen the 
effects of disruptions. Chapter 4 of this dissertation is to devise contingent rerouting plans 
to strengthen the network’s adaptive capacity. And, in Chapter 5, network restoration 
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activities, in terms of the order in which disrupted components should be recovered to 
enhance the economic productivity, are discussed. Finally, in Chapter 6, concluding 








FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 states that critical infrastructure “must be secure 
and able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards” (The White House 2013). 
This combination of the ability to (i) withstand the effects of a disruption and (ii) recover 
timely from the disruption is often referred to as resilience (Hosseini et al. 2016). Figure 
2.1. highlights these two dimensions of resilience: vulnerability and recoverability (Henry 
and Ramirez-Marquez 2012, Pant et al. 2014). The network service function 𝜑(𝑡) 
describes the behavior or performance of the network at time 𝑡 (e.g., 𝜑(𝑡) could describe 
traffic or commodity flow in a transportation network). The vulnerability dimension of 
resilience is the focus of this work.  
 
Figure 2.1. System performance, (t), trajectory following a disruptive event 






In a freight transportation network, vulnerability is considered to be a problem of 
interrupted serviceability or accessibility of network components, leading to reduced 
system functionality (Berdica 2002, Chen et al. 2007). O’Kelly (2014) classifies network 
vulnerability into link vulnerability, or the reduction of a network’s capability after losing 
a link, and nodal vulnerability, or the extent to which a node plays a critical role in the 
operation of the whole network. From the network interdiction literature, where network 
components (nodes or arcs) are disabled intentionally, there are three approaches to 
evaluate network vulnerability (Murray et al. 2008): (i) scenario-specific evaluation, 
where the potential consequences of a specific disruptive scenario or set of scenarios is 
evaluated (e.g., studying the impact of losing a bridge, a road segment, or a hub on 
network performance (Jenelius and Mattsson 2012, Burgholzer et al. 2013, Rupi et al. 
2014, Fotuhi and Huynh 2017)), (ii) strategy-specific assessment, where vulnerability is 
assessed with respect to a hypothesized sequence or strategy of disruptions targeting 
components perceived to be important (e.g., Erath et al. 2010, Park et al. 2011, Knoop et 
al. 2012), and (iii) mathematical modeling assessment (e.g., Sullivan et al. 2010, Jenelius 
et al. 2010), using game-theoretical techniques to find worst-case scenarios. In our work, 
to analyze network vulnerability and define a measure of importance for network 
components, a scenario-specific approach is taken by analyzing the proportional effect 
on the flow of commodities given the removal of one node/link at time.   
Most work in network vulnerability focuses on network behavior after a 
disruption in terms of graph theoretic measures, such as average shortest distance, 
network diameter, average edge betweenness, and cluster efficiency (e.g., Albert and 




et al. 2013), which describe what is commonly referred to as structural vulnerability. This 
is different from functional vulnerability, where operational characteristics (e.g., network 
flow) of different components are taken into consideration (Ouyang et al 2009). To 
capture the functional aspects of network vulnerability, a measure of importance for 
network components was introduced by Nagurney and Qiang (2008, 2007a,b) based on 
network performance/efficiency considering demands, costs, and flows, as well as 
behavior of the users of the network. Following the lead of Nagurney and Qiang, the 
emphasis of this work deals with describing network vulnerability with respect to flow 
along the network, a more tangible approach than focusing solely on topological features 
of the network and amenable to an analysis of multi-industry economic impacts. That is, 
𝜑(𝑡) is used to describe the flow along the transportation network. Further literature 
describing network component importance based on flow measures is sparse (Rocco et 
al. 2010, Nicholson et al. 2016), and, to the authors’ knowledge, the methodology 
proposed in this work for pinpointing the contribution and importance of individual 
transportation network components to multi-industry economic impacts is an area that 
has not been previously pursued in the literature.  
 This chapter considers network vulnerability as a relative drop in the commodity 
flows along the network after the removal of a particular node or link. And a drop in the 
flow of commodities would generate subsequent impacts on multiple industries relying 
on those commodities. While several approaches have been proposed to capture 
interdependencies among infrastructure and industries (Pederson et al. 2006, Haimes 
2009, Rose et al. 2012, Ouyang 2014), this work makes use of an economic input-output 




to which industry output will not be produced) caused by perturbations in supply and/or 
demand.  
Despite the excellent use of network-based models in representing 
interdependencies which consider various aspects of network vulnerability (Holden et al. 
2013, Miller-Hooks et al. 2012, Pederson et al. 2006), there exists a need to integrate parts 
of these models with multi-industry impacts to address freight transportation functionality 
as enabling the flow of commodities and facilitating economic productivity. This need is 
addressed with a four-step methodology, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, which then 
culminates in a transportation network component importance measure.  
 
Figure 2.2. Four step approach to assessing transportation component 
importance with multi-industry impacts. 
 
2.2.1 Baseline Network Flow 
To study the vulnerability of a multi-modal freight transportation network, which 




corresponding supply and demand nodes must be extracted. The conventional MCNF 
problem for a network, 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐿) with a set of nodes, 𝑁, a set of links, 𝐿, and a number 𝐾 
of commodities, is formulated in model M1. The flow of commodity 𝑘 on link (𝑖, 𝑗) is 
represented with 𝑓 , and the cost of shipment for commodity k on link (𝑖, 𝑗) is 𝑤 . The 
capacity of link (𝑖, 𝑗) is represented with 𝑢 , and the supply/demand of commodity 𝑘 at 
node 𝑖 is represented with 𝑏 , defining the “bundle” and “mass balance” constraints in 
model M1, respectively. Note that 𝑏  is positive for supply nodes, negative for demand 
nodes, and zero for transshipment (or intermediate) nodes. The capacity of each link is 
considered as a shared constraint for all commodities flowing on the link.   
𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑤 𝑓
( , )∈ 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑓 ≤  𝑢  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿
𝑓
( , )∈ 
−  𝑓
( , )∈ 
=  𝑏   ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾
𝑓 ≥ 0, ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾    
 (M1) 
 
In fact, a generic MCNF model provides a means to formulate the supply-demand 
network in which a multi-modal freight transportation network connects industries and 
enables trading relationships and interactions. From a tactical point of view, the 
integration of (i) business economic sectors and (ii) their supply capabilities or demand 
requirements together with (iii) the structure of the transportation network can result in a 
minimum cost MCNF model that can route the commodities from suppliers to the demand 
nodes via 𝑓 , collectively representing the flow of commodities on the links of a baseline 




2.2.2 Network Disruption 
This step evaluates the effect of losing a network component on freight flow 
through the network and resulting consequences on supply/demand nodes. Hence, a 
disruptive scenario is defined as the removal of a particular network component. An 
optimization formulation is developed to reroute commodity flows through the residual 
network, pursuing the maximum flow throughout the network and capturing failure in the 
form of remaining commodities at supply nodes and unmet demands at demand nodes, as 
formulated in model M2. Intuitively, a decision maker would likely desire to reroute 
commodities to take advantage of the remaining capacity of the residual network. Note 
the difference in perspective in the post-disruption MCNF developed here: prior to the 
disruption, model M1 minimizes the cost of transporting commodities along the 
capacitated network, where model M2 maximizes the flow to meet as much demand as 
possible given the interrupted network with an updated set of links, 𝐿 , and nodes 𝑁 . To 
capture undelivered commodities remaining with the suppliers or unsatisfied demand at 
demand nodes, a slac𝐿 ,k variable 𝑆  is defined. The magnitude of 𝑆  is positive, and 
multiplier 𝛾  takes on a negative value for the set of demand nodes (after disruption) 𝑁 , 
a positive value for supply nodes (after disruption) 𝑁 , and zero for transshipment nodes 
(after disruption) 𝑁 . The objective function maximizes the sum of commodity-specific 
flows, where 𝑓  represents the flow of commodity 𝑘 across link (𝑖, 𝑗) which remains in 
the updated set of links, 𝐿 .  Slack variable 𝑆  will be used in the next step to calculate 
inoperability among multiple industries. Here it is assumed that each type of commodity 




regional economy caused by unsatisfactory levels of demands/supplies will be pursued in 
the next step.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓
( , )∈ 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑓 ≤  𝑢  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿
𝑓
( , )∈ 
− 𝑓
( , )∈ 





       
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑓 ≥ 0, 𝑆 ≥ 0  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿 , 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾
 (M2) 
2.2.3 Multi-Industry Economic Impact 
When a disruption within the transportation network results in remaining 
commodities at supply nodes and/or unmet demand at demand nodes, inoperability 
propagates throughout industries in a region. Without loss of generality, each node within 
the network is considered to be either a supplier or a consumer of a particular commodity. 
Each commodity belongs to an industry in the economy as defined by the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). To represent the multi-industry impacts of 
unmet demands at demand nodes and remaining commodities at the suppliers’ side in the 
MCNF, an extension of the input-output model is used. The input-output (I-O) model, for 
which Wassily Leontief (1966) won a Nobel Prize, has been widely accepted as a useful 
model for analyzing the interdependent connections among industries (Miller and Blair 
2009). Under a static equilibrium, the total output of the industry 𝑠 is distributed to other 
industries and also satisfies external (consumer) demand. This equilibrium condition is 




flow of commodities produced by industry 𝑘 and used as input to production in industry 
𝑟, and 𝑐  is the external demand for industry 𝑘. The flow of commodities 𝑧  is assumed 
to be proportional to the output of industry 𝑟 (𝑟 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} and 𝑟 ≠ 𝑘), expressed as 
𝑧 =  𝑎 𝑥 . Further, it is assumed that each industry produces a sole commodity, such 
that industry 𝑘 produces commodity 𝑘. The common form of the Leontief input-output 
model is expressed in Eq. (2.1), where 𝐱 is the vector of industry production outputs, 𝐀 
is an industry-by-industry matrix of interdependency coefficients, 𝑎 , and 𝐜 is a vector 
of final demands. The model shows that total production is made up of industry-to-
industry intermediate production, 𝐀𝐱, and production to satisfy final demand, 𝐜. Terms 
𝑧 , 𝑥 , and 𝑐  are measured in monetary units. 
𝒙 = Ax + 𝒄 ⇒ 𝒙 = [𝑰 − 𝑨] 𝒄 (2.1) 
 
Instead of describing the connections between the interdependent industries in 
terms of commodity flow dollars, the IIM illustrates how normalized production losses 
propagate through interconnected industries, providing a different perspective from the 
traditional I-O model.  The IIM is provided in Eq. (2.2), describing the relationships 
among 𝐾 industries, resulting in matrices of size 𝐾×𝐾 and vectors of length 𝐾. 
𝒒 = 𝑨⋆𝒒 + 𝒄⋆ ⇒ 𝒒 = [𝑰 − 𝑨⋆] 𝒄⋆ (2.2) 
 
Vector 𝐪 is a vector of industry inoperability describing the proportional extent to 
which as-planned productivity or functionality is not realized following a disruptive 
event. Inoperability for industry 𝑘 is defined in Eq. (2.3), where as-planned total output 




with 𝑥 . An inoperability of 0 suggests that an industry is operating at normal production 
levels, while an inoperability of 1 suggests that the industry has become completely 
inoperable. 
𝑞 = (𝑥 − 𝑥 ) 𝑥⁄  ⟺ 𝒒 = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒙)] (𝒙 − 𝒙) (2.3) 
 
Normalized interdependency matrix 𝐀⋆ is a normalized form of the original 𝐀 
matrix describing the extent of interdependence among a set of industries. As stated by 
Eq. (2.4), the row elements of 𝐀⋆ indicate the proportion of additional inoperability that 
are contributed by a column industry to the row industry. 
𝑎⋆ = 𝑎 (𝑥 𝑥⁄ )  ⟺ 𝑨⋆ = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒙)] 𝑨[𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒙)] (2.4) 
 
Eq. (2.5) provides the calculation of 𝐜⋆, a vector of normalized demand reduction. 
The elements of 𝐜⋆ represent the difference in as-planned demand ?̂?  and perturbed 
demand ?̃?  divided by as-planned production, quantifying the reduced final demand for 
industry 𝑘 as a proportion of total as-planned output. 
𝑐⋆ = (?̂? − ?̃? ) 𝑥⁄  ⟺ 𝒄⋆ = [𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝒙)] (𝒄 − 𝒄) (2.5) 
 
For the traditional economic loss metric, losses can be calculated by multiplying 
each industry’s production level in monetary units by its inoperability level: for industry 
𝑘, 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞 , or for the entire economy of industries, 𝑄 = 𝐱 𝐪. As such, planning 
decisions can be made with respect to inoperability or economic impact at the industry 




The freight transportation network provides a platform for commodity flows 
between industries. Since the IIM models how demand-related risk in a given industry 
propagates to other industries due to their interdependent productivity, the multi-industry 
impact of a disruption to a freight transportation network can be studied when network 
losses are related to final consumption reduction and inoperability terms as shown in 
subsequent subsections. The demand-reduction IIM proposed by Santos and Haimes 
(2004) has been successfully employed to study multi-industry impacts of perturbations 
in supply and demand (e.g., Resurreccion and Santos (2013), Pant et al. (2011), Haggerty 
et al. (2008), Lian and Haimes (2006)). However, some (e.g., Kujawski (2006), Kelly 
(2015)) have questioned the usefulness (and theoretical plausibility) of supply-driven 
models developed from concepts by Ghosh (1985). Leung et al. (2007) integrated a 
supply-side price IIM and output-side IIM to address initiating perturbations related to 
input factors (value added) and to industry output levels, though some aspects of this 
model may be impractical for integration with supply-demand networks as applied in our 
proposed approach (though may be effective in modeling disruptions to manufacturing 
systems, as noted by Kelly (2015)). Here, we translate a disruption in the form of 
remaining commodities at supply nodes and/or unmet demand at demand nodes into the 
two IIM metrics of inoperability and final consumption perturbation, based on a demand-
reduction IIM implemented by Pant et al. (2011) in modeling supply and demand 
perturbation caused by a port closure. Pant et al. (2011) considered commodities 
remaining at suppliers after a disruption to calculate the final consumption perturbation. 
And the authors considered unmet demands to calculate a “forced” demand reduction, 




the final external consumption remains virtually unaffected. In such a case, the demand 
nodes temporarily sacrifice their internal need for that commodity until it returns to its 
as-planned supply level, and a surrogate to supply reduction is calculated from the 
combination of “forced” internal consumption and an output inoperability.  
In the following subsections, 𝑁  represents the set of nodes within the area of 
interest 𝛼, and 𝑁  represents the set of nodes outside of the area of interest, such that 
𝑁 = 𝑁 ∪ 𝑁 . We formulate the economic consequences of a failure within a particular 
area of interest (e.g., a business economic area, county, state, entire country). As such, 
the failure in the form of remaining commodities at suppliers and unmet demand at 
consumers are captured only in the nodes within the area of interest and each of the 
economic parameters (i.e., 𝐱, 𝐜, 𝐜⋆and 𝐪) are indicators of the industries specific to the 
region of interest. To simplify the notation, superscript 𝛼 is not included for these 
economic metrics to avoid unnecessary indices.  
Modeling Remaining Supply: Transportation facilities operate as facilitators of 
commodity flows across business economic areas. For a supplier of commodity 𝑘 located 
in node 𝑖, any transportation network disruption that perturbs its desired export will be 
considered to be a reduction in final consumption. As modeled in Eq. (2.6), final 
consumption for industry 𝑘 includes commodities consumed by industry k itself 
internally, (?̂? ) , and the amount of external consumption that is exported through the 
network, (?̂? ) . It is assumed that the disruption results in losses of commodity flows 
only through the network, while industry production activities unrelated to the network 
experience no direct failure but might be affected indirectly by a disruption within the 




difficulty only in exporting commodities, it experiences commodities remaining at supply 
nodes in the region of interest totaling ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) , where 𝑁  represents the set of 
nodes that are home to suppliers in the region of interest 𝛼 after the disruption, as shown 
in Eq. (2.7). As such, the final consumption perturbation for industries that experience 
difficulties only in exporting commodities is modeled as the amount of slack divided by 
as-planned industry output in Eq. (2.8), Note that the supply-demand network may consist 
of suppliers and consumers located outside of the region of interest, yet failures to these 
suppliers and consumers are not accounted for in this model.   
?̂? = (?̂? ) + (?̂? )           𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (2.6) 
 
?̂? − ?̃? = 𝑆𝑖
 ∈( ∩ )




∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
            𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (2.8) 
 
Modeling Unmet Demand: As discussed by Pant et al. (2011), the amount of 
import (input) of industry k at demand nodes in the supply-demand network defined as 
∑ −𝑏𝑖 ∈ ∩  contributes toward the production activity and the internal consumption 
of industry k. Thus, when industry k has difficulty only in importing commodities, it 
experiences unmet demands in the region of interest totaling ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) . This results 




consumption, ∆(?̂? ) . Here, 𝑁  represents the set of nodes after disruption located in 
the geographical area of interest 𝛼 that are home to consumers of commodity k. 
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) = ∆𝑥 + ∆(?̂? )             𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}   (2.9) 
 
Therefore, for industry 𝑘, unmet demand causes an inoperability, 𝑞 , measured as 
the loss of production in industry k as a proportion of its original production level, as 
shown in Eq. (2.3) with ∆𝑥 𝑥⁄ . Also, internal consumption failure, as shown in Eq. 
(2.6), causes a final consumption perturbation, 𝑐⋆, and is modeled as a measure of the 
change in the final consumption as a proportion of the original production level in 
industry k, as shown in Eq. (2.5) with ∆?̂? 𝑥⁄ . The approach to formulate failure in the 
form of unmet demand is adapted from the port disruption work of Pant et al. (2011, 
2015) and the transportation network vulnerability formulation of Darayi et al. (2017), in 
which a slack variable 𝑆  is defined to capture unsatisfied demand at demand nodes (or 
undelivered commodities remaining with the suppliers), shown in Eq. (2.10). For the 
industries experiencing difficulties only in importing their required commodities, there 




∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) − ∆𝑥
𝑥
         𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (2.10) 
 
𝑐⋆ =
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
− 𝑞         𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (2.11) 
 
Eqs. (2.8) and (2.11) combined with the IIM in Eq. (2.2) form a complete solvable 




collection of 𝐾 interconnected industries. For simplicity, the demand perturbations in 
Eqs. (2.8) and (2.11) assume failure in either only demand nodes or only supply nodes 
within a particular industry, whereas in actual situations, some industries would likely 
consist of both supply and demand nodes. Therefore, the total final consumption 
perturbation for industry 𝑘, in the case of having both importing (demand) and exporting 
(supply) roles, is given in Eq. (2.12). 
𝑐⋆ =
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
+
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
− 𝑞                 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} (2.12) 
 
Any of Eqs. (2.8), (2.11), or (2.12) captures the perturbation vector 𝐜⋆ that 
parameterizes the interdependency model in Eq. (2.2) based on the exporting or importing 
nature of the nodes belonging to each industry. Thus, q can then be calculated to measure 
the proportional extent to which as-planned productivity or functionality is not realized 
following a transportation network disruption that results in unmet demand or 
commodities remaining with suppliers, and a contingent rerouting strategy can be devised 
during the period of disruption to lessen the multi-industry impact of the disruption. 
2.2.4 Vulnerability Analysis and Component Importance 
Network vulnerability analysis emerged from the network reliability literature, 
which is often interested in the probability of a desired network performance (Boesch 
2009) or the consequences of the failure of a network component regardless of the 
probability of failure (Taylor and Susilawati 2012, Ramirez-Marquez et al. 2016). This 




studied area in reliability engineering (Kuo and Zhu 2012), wherein network components 
that impact the performance of the network are identified.  
 Step 4 develops scenario-specific component importance measures based on 
vulnerability. The consideration of the economic impacts of a disruption of transportation 
network components enhances the literature on transportation network vulnerability, 
which have traditionally focused on flow or topological aspects of the network (e.g., 
connectivity and accessibility) as metrics for network performance (Reggiani et al. 2015, 
Mattsson and Jenelius 2015, Sun et al. 2017). As such, when we define our new 
importance measure, we consider the ultimate role of a freight transportation network as 
a facilitator of economic productivity. Such impact is calculated for different disruptive 
scenarios, 𝑒 , where 𝑝 represents the component removed from the network (as displayed 
in Figure 2.1). As a result, this work advances the study of network vulnerability from 
the perspective of network performance in terms of commodity-driven multi-industry 
impact rather than graph theoretic or flow importance measures. Malfunction of a freight 
transportation network serving a regional economy -- comprised of interdependent 
industries -- causes failure in the form of a delayed shipment of commodities at supply 
nodes and/or unmet demands at demand nodes. Here, the interdependent effect of the 
failure in multiple industries is captured by the IIM as described in Section 2.2.3. And 
finally, vulnerability is defined as the magnitude of this failure in terms of multi-industry 
economic impact, given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event, 𝑒 . Note, of 
course, that network vulnerability is highly dependent upon the type and extent of 𝑒 , 
which assumes complete removal of component 𝑝 (though a proportional reduction could 





Two vulnerability measures, stated in Eqs. (2.13) and (2.14), are proposed. For 
network topology 𝐺, fixed demand/supply vector 𝐛, and disrupted (removed) component 
𝑝, vulnerability is measured as the relative network efficiency, or the multi-industry 
economic loss 𝑄(𝐺 − 𝑝, 𝐛), after 𝑝 is removed from the network, 𝐺. 𝑄  is the 
maximum multi-industry loss caused by a shutdown in the entire network (i.e., a removal 
of all nodes). As such, the vulnerability measure in Eq. (2.13) quantifies the proportional 
economy-wide impact of a loss of component 𝑝 relative to a loss in all components.  This 
measure lies on (0,1), where 0 means that losing component p has no effect on the total 
economy and 1 means that the loss of component p is as disruptive as having a shutdown 
of the entire network. 
𝜂 (𝐺, 𝐛) =  




Eq. (2.14) similarly provides the economic vulnerability experienced by a 
particular industry 𝑘 due to lost component 𝑝, providing an industry-by-industry 
perspective to the importance of vulnerable transportation network elements. 𝑄  is the 
maximum loss in a particular industry 𝑘 caused by a shutdown in the entire network, 
capturing indirect economic loss effect on each industry based on the IIM. 
𝜂 (𝐺, 𝒃) =  







Thus, Eqs. (2.13) and (2.14) provide economy-wide and industry-specific 
vulnerability measures for the disruption of component 𝑝 in the multi-modal 
transportation network. Naturally, certain industries may be more impacted by certain 
network components than others, which is an important consideration (e.g., a particular 
industry may be more critical to a state or regional economy than another).  
The proposed transportation network vulnerability analysis methodology and 
component importance measures, found as a result of the four-step process in Section 2.2, 
is illustrated with a case study based on a portion of a multi-modal freight transportation 
network within the state of Oklahoma and surrounding states whose industries trade with 
Oklahoma industries. Oklahoma plays a strong role in the transport of goods via a multi-
modal transportation network consisting of three important interstate highways, as well 
as railways and inland waterways that connect to the Mississippi River Navigation 
System via two ports. 
2.3.1 Baseline Network Flow, Illustrated 
Figure 2.3 highlights a supply-demand network in which supply nodes are all 
within the state of Oklahoma: the three important business economic areas of Oklahoma 
City (node 1), the Port of Catoosa in Tulsa (node 2), and the Port of Muskogee (node 3) 
(Ingalls et al. 2002). Demand nodes consist of states external to Oklahoma that are the 
most important states to interact with Oklahoma industries: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Illinois. The effects of a disruption within the network on exporting industries within 




four importing states are considered as four combined demand nodes connecting to 
Oklahoma’s multi-modal freight transportation network. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.3. Representations of (a) spatial location of multi-modal nodes in 
Oklahoma and surrounding states, and (b) the connected transportation network. 
 
 
The nodes of the network are discussed in brief in Table 2.1 The Oklahoma City 
business economic area is connected to the north-south corridor through I-35 and east-
west corridor through I-40 and I-44. In addition to the truck way facilities, Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad has an intermodal rail-truck facility in Oklahoma City 
near the junction of I-35 and I-40. The Port of Catoosa, the largest inland port in the 
United States in terms of area, is located near the city of Tulsa, adjacent to I-44, US 169, 
and rail lines. Industries listed in Table 2.2 are almost the port’s largest exporters in terms 
of commodity flows. The Port of Muskogee is connected to the freight transportation 
network through Highway 165 and a rail marshalling yard.  Supply nodes in Figure 2.3 




(node 3). Demand nodes include Texas city, TX (node 4), New Orleans, LA (node 5), 
Little Rock, AR (node 6), and Chicago, IL (node 7). Node 8 represents the intermodal 
terminal that facilitates the movement of commodities from industries in the industrial 
park of Port of Catoosa to their out-of-state customers using railroad company, BNSF. 
Links (1,7) and (1,4) are part of the North America railroad which connects Oklahoma 
City, OK, with Chicago, IL, and with Texas City, TX, respectively. The Port of Catoosa 
is connected to the North America railroad through a local railroad represented by link 
(2,8).  Links (2,5), (2,4), (2,6), and (2,7) are part of the inland waterway network 
navigated by McClellan–Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System and connect Port of 
Catoosa with the Port of New Orleans, the Port of Texas City, the Port of Little Rock, 
and the Port of Chicago, respectively.  The Port of Muskogee is connected to the Port of 
Little Rock, the Port of Texas City, and the Port of New Orleans through the same inland 
waterway network represented by links (3,6), (3,4), and (3,5), respectively, and it is linked 
to the North America railroad through a local railroad depicted with link (3,8). Node 9 is 
an intermediate node that connects the Oklahoma City business economic area to the U.S. 
interstate highways to the north and south through I-35 and to the east through I-44. Node 
10 is Fort Smith, AR which is a connecting point on I-40 to link Oklahoma City and 
Tulsa, OK to Little Rock, AR. Node 11 represents an intermediate node that connects the 
Port of Catoosa industrial park to interstate highway I-44, link (9,4) connects Oklahoma 
City to Texas City, TX, using interstate highways I-35 and I-45, and link (9,11) is part of 






Table 2.1 Spatial location of multi-modal nodes in Oklahoma and surrounding 
states. 
Component Description 
Node 1 Oklahoma City, a supply node for multiple industries 
Node 2 Port of Catoosa, a supply node for multiple industries 
Node 3 Port of Muskogee, a supply node for multiple industries 
Node 4 Port of Texas City, a demand node for multiple industries 
Node 5 Port of New Orleans, a demand node for multiple industries 
Node 6 Port of Little Rock, a demand node for multiple industries 
Node 7 Port of Chicago, a demand node for multiple industries 
Node 8 Intermodal terminal, Tulsa, OK 
Node 9 Transshipment node that connects the Oklahoma City, OK, business economic 
area to the north and south through I-35 and to the east through I-44 
Node 10 Transshipment node in Fort Smith, AR, that is a connecting point on I-40 to 
link Oklahoma City and Tulsa, OK to Little Rock, AR 
Node 11 Transshipment node that connects the Tulsa Port of Catoosa industrial park to 
I-44 





Part of the North America railroad which connects Tulsa, OK, with Chicago, 
IL and Texas City, TX, respectively 
Link (2,8) A local railroad connecting Port of Catoosa to the North America railroad  
Link (1,4) Part of the North America railroad that connects Oklahoma City, OK with 




Part of the inland waterway network navigated by McClellan–Kerr Arkansas 
River Navigation System and connect Port of Catoosa with the Port of New 





Part of the inland waterway network navigated by McClellan–Kerr Arkansas 
River Navigation System and connect the Port of Muskogee to the Port of 
Little Rock, the Port of Texas City, and the Port of New Orleans, respectively 
Link (9,4) The roadway that connects Oklahoma City to Texas City, TX using interstate 
highways I-35 and I-45 
Link (9,11) Part of interstate highway I-44 that connects Oklahoma City to Tulsa. 
 
In total, there are 62 industries operating in Oklahoma as identified by NAICS, 
suggesting that the 𝐀⋆ matrix regionalized for Oklahoma is 62 × 62. In the proposed 
supply-demand network, six industries, listed in Table 2.2, are considered to be industries 
that primarily export commodities to out-of-state customers according to high trade 




example, each commodity belongs to an industry as defined by NAICS economic sectors, 
and each node within the network is considered to be either a supplier or a customer of a 
particular commodity. 
Table 2.2. Names and NAICS codes for main industries using the network. 
Industry name NAICS code 
Food and beverage and tobacco products  311 
Petroleum and coal products  324 
Chemical products  325 
Nonmetallic mineral products  327 
Machinery  333 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  339 
 
Table 2.3 lists the combined estimated annual supply and demand in tons for the 
associated industries and states, compiled from different databases (US Army Corps of 
Engineers 2013, Tulsa Port of Catoosa 2013, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2010a,b, 
Port of Muskogee 2013, Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010). 
Table 2.3. Combined annual demands/supplies at supply/demand nodes connecting 
through the network (in thousand tons). 














      
Oklahoma 
City 
4351 0 3606 2198 285 1419 
Port of 
Catoosa 
603 5459 3416 303 30 5 
Port of 
Muskogee 




      
Texas City, 
TX 
1167 3804 2448 0 310 362 
New 
Orleans, LA 
604 221 0 0 3 0 
Little Rock, 
AR 
3183 1842 4574 492 2 654 





Baseline network flow in the supply-demand network is calculated with model 
M1, where the cost vector is computed based on the transportation mode and the mileage 
of the distances between nodes. The cost per ton-mile for a barge is estimated at $0.97, 
compared to $2.53 for rail, and $5.35 for trucking (Arkansas Waterway Commissions 
2014). The capacity of each link, shown in Table 2.4, representing the availability of 
transportation facilities, is estimated from historical data as a shared constraint for all 
commodities flowing on the link (ODOT 2013). The baseline flow resulted in no 
remaining commodities at supply nodes and no unsatisfied demand at demand nodes, 
suggesting that supply nodes send out all the commodities and demand nodes satisfy all 
their demands. Based on Table 2.3, the total supply of commodity k is assumed to be 
equal to the total demand of the same commodity within the entire supply-demand 
network as depicted in Figure 2.3.  
Table 2.4. Link capacities among the origin/destination nodes in the illustrative 
network (in thousand tons) (ODOT 2013). 
Nodes 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 2800   2900  1700 6200  
2 180 650 750 500 3400  3700 1350 
3 355 185 3010  290    
8 3800   300     
9 1800       1700 
10   12000      
11    1600  2000   
 
2.3.2 Network Disruption, Illustrated 
Considering a disruptive scenario as the removal of a particular network 
component, the supply-demand network might experience a failure in satisfying demands 
in the interrupted network. The network components that were considered for disruption 




role in connecting segments of high volume-freight-traffic interstate highways, (ii) some 
segments of the North America Railroad, (iii) a local railroad which connects industrial 
parks to the North America Railroad, and (iv) parts of waterway system (described in 
Table 2.1). Discussed previously in Section 2.2.2, a decision maker would likely desire 
to reroute commodities to take advantage of the remaining capacity of the residual 
network, as shown in model M2, by maximizing the flow to meet as much demand as 
possible given the interrupted network. Failure in the form of undelivered commodities 
remaining with the suppliers, or unsatisfied demand at demand nodes, represented by 𝑆 , 
affect industry output and inoperability propagates through many of the interconnected 
industries. In the illustrative example, all the supply nodes are within the state of 
Oklahoma and the four demand nodes are located outside of Oklahoma. Table 2.5 reports 
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) , the sum of the slack (remaining supply) by industry type at the supply 
nodes when different network components are disrupted.  
Table 2.5. Commodities remaining at suppliers with the removal of network 
















Node 9 291 0 803 0 25 2 
Node 8 478 2508 623 0 0 7 
Node 11 34 143 1067 0 25 7 
Link (1,7) 290 0 0 2000 0 770 
Link 
(9,11) 
189 108 823 0 0 0 
Link (2,5) 504 37 0 0 28 0 
Link (8,4) 367 2108 923 0 0 7 
Link (2,8) 189 2308 823 0 0 5 
Link (2,4) 0 105 0 0 0 0 
Link (3,8) 0 0 0 210 5 0 








2.3.3 Multi-industry Impact, Illustrated 
In the case of any disruption within the network resulting in the loss of exports, 
there is a demand perturbation in the industries using the network, as calculated in Eq. 
(2.13). Assuming the only losses in the state economy are due to the loss of exports, the 
interdependent cascade of the demand perturbations causes losses to all the other state 
industries, as captured in Q. It is further assumed that industries not using the 
transportation network have zero demand perturbations, though could suffer from 
interdependent inoperability.  
As network component importance rankings are ultimately calculated on a 
relative basis, inoperability is calculated in terms of annual impact, as it is assumed that 
annual industry production accumulates consistently across the year (i.e., neither 
production nor interdependency relationships vary day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-
month). A smaller time horizon could be considered as a proportion of a year if a 
particular disruptive event is modeled (e.g., a two-week closure of port facilities (Pant et 
al. 2011)).   
Using the remaining commodities left at supply nodes, shown in Table 2.5, 
demand perturbations were calculated with Eq. (2.13). In the example, the industries in 
Oklahoma experience difficulties in exporting commodities, individually for each of the 
11 disrupted network components. The resulting industry inoperability, 𝑞 , for each 
disrupted component is found, as shown in Table 2.6 and plotted in Figure 2.4. Results 
show that most industries are vulnerable to disruptions that affect the functionality of 
either rail transportation or interstate highways but less susceptible to disruptions to the 




freight movement in Oklahoma. As such, perhaps the external capacity in rail and truck 
freight transport suggest that they could serve as alternative transportation modes during 
a disruption, though more costly. A disruption that affects the functionality of the 
intermodal terminals would cause the most significant drop in the productivity of most 
industries. Examples of this include (i) node 8, which facilitates trade between industries 
located in the business economic area in Port of Catoosa, OK with their customers in 
Chicago, IL and Texas City, TX through the North America railroad, and (ii) nodes 9 and 
11, important transshipment nodes that connect the three important business economic 
areas within the state of Oklahoma to their customers through interstate highways.  
From a single industry point of view, it is shown that the productivity of the 
Petroleum and coal (324) industry is mostly vulnerable to its accessibility to the North 
America railroad through the intermodal terminal (node 8) in Tulsa, OK. In general, most 
disruption scenarios may affect the productivity of the Chemical products (325) industry, 
either by a local disruption that interrupts the access of the business economic area at the 
Port of Catoosa through a local railroad (e.g., link (2,8) to the intermodal terminal at node 
8) or a state-wide disruption that affects Oklahoma’s major trucking corridors (e.g., 
interstate highways I-35, I-44, and I-40). Also shown is that parts of the transportation 
network that are less important for most industries may be quite important to the 
productivity of a particular industry (e.g., the Nonmetallic and mineral products (327) 
industry is influenced by the malfunction of the local railroad which connects the Port of 
Muskogee to the North America railroad (link (3,8)) though all the other five industries 
are much less vulnerable to this link). Understanding these inoperability-related 




transportation modes. The inoperability values in Table 2.6 may appear to be negligible 
at first, but these numbers are significant when linked to the concept of failure probability 
in the reliability or quality engineering literature (i.e., the maximum allowable failure 
probability for a six-sigma compliant system is 3.4E-06).  
 

















Node 9 2.98E-04 7.15E-06 4.37E-04 1.21E-05 1.81E-04 2.64E-05 
Node 8 4.93E-04 1.11E-03 4.25E-04 4.03E-05 1.82E-05 9.44E-05 
Node 11 3.61E-05 6.83E-05 5.71E-04 8.27E-06 1.80E-04 2.37E-05 
Link 
(1,7) 
3.02E-04 1.11E-05 2.86E-05 9.12E-04 7.71E-06 5.56E-04 
Link 
(9,11) 
1.94E-04 5.20E-05 4.43E-04 6.54E-06 2.37E-06 1.42E-05 
Link 
(2,5) 
5.16E-04 2.28E-05 2.43E-05 1.69E-05 2.05E-04 3.36E-05 
Link 
(8,4) 
3.80E-04 9.33E-04 5.66E-04 3.34E-05 1.53E-05 8.01E-05 
Link 
(2,8) 
1.98E-04 1.02E-03 5.14E-04 3.15E-05 1.53E-05 7.61E-05 
Link 
(2,4) 
1.61E-07 4.63E-05 3.39E-06 1.20E-06 6.19E-07 2.79E-06 
Link 
(3,8) 
1.41E-07 7.11E-07 2.15E-06 1.06E-04 3.80E-05 2.84E-06 
Link 






Figure 2.4. Economic inoperability across six most important industries within the 
state of Oklahoma. 
 
 
In addition to inoperability, the complementary perspective of economic losses in 
Table 2.7 can supplement the analysis. The Petroleum and coal products (324) industry 
is a high dollar industry in Oklahoma, and this industry would be significantly impacted 
by a disruption that affects the functionality of rail transportation (e.g., a local railroad 
such as link (2,8), part of the level-one railroad that connects Oklahoma to the North 
America railroad such as link (8,4), or intermodal terminal facilities such as node 8. A 
second prominent industry is the Food, beverage, and tobacco products (311) industry, 
and several transportation components contribute to the dollar volume of production in 
this industry, especially a part of the inland waterway network that connects Port of 
Catoosa with the Port of New Orleans, LA (link (2,5)), and part of the North America 
railroad that connects Tulsa, OK with Texas City, TX (link (8,4)). In fact, the intermodal 
terminal (node 8) which facilitates freight transport at the Port of Catoosa is a prominent 














rail transportation and major trucking corridors have a high impact on the economy of 
most industries, though less important components (e.g., part of the inland waterway such 
as links (2,4) or (2,5)) may still have a large impact on a particular industry (e.g., 
Miscellaneous manufacturing (339) and Petroleum and coal products (324) by millions 
of dollars).  
Table 2.7. Economic losses (in 100 million USD) across the six most important 















Node 9 1.627 0.090 0.594 0.025 1.308 0.267 
Node 8 2.688 13.974 0.578 0.082 0.132 0.954 
Node 11 0.197 0.860 0.777 0.017 1.304 0.240 
Link (1,7) 1.647 0.140 0.039 1.854 0.056 5.622 
Link (9,11) 1.059 0.655 0.602 0.013 0.017 0.143 
Link (2,5) 2.813 0.287 0.033 0.034 1.484 0.340 
Link (8,4) 2.072 11.757 0.769 0.068 0.111 0.810 
Link (2,8) 1.079 12.837 0.698 0.064 0.111 0.769 
Link (2,4) 0.001 0.583 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.028 
Link (3,8) 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.216 0.275 0.029 
Link (8,7) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.256 0.002 0.010 
 
2.3.4 Vulnerability Analysis and Component Importance, Illustrated 
The component importance measures, quantifying the proportional economy-
wide impact of a loss of component 𝑝 relative to a loss of the whole network, are 
calculated with Eq. (2.13) and are depicted in Figure 2.5. This measure lies on (0,1), 
where 𝜂 = 0 means that the removal of component 𝑝 doesn’t affect the whole economy, 
and 𝜂 = 1 means that the particular component removal shut downs the whole economy. 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the most important components relate to the rail transportation 
and major trucking corridors. A main component of the rail freight transport, node 8 is 




Port of Catoosa to out-of-state customers and is the most important component in the 
analyzed transportation network. This facility is followed by link (8,4), a portion of 
railroad that connects Oklahoma to Texas City, TX, link (2,8), a local railroad that 
connects the Port of Catoosa to the North America railroad intermodal terminal, and link 
(1,7), a portion of railroad that connects Oklahoma City, OK to Chicago, IL. This suggests 
a further attention to the functionality of the facilities of the most important components 
within the network to avoid any malfunction, or in the case of any disaster which 
deactivates multiple components of the network, there should be priorities to recover the 
most important components. The framework proposed here could be used to evaluate 
alternative transportation modes for shipping commodities after a disruption or to guide 
planning for transportation investments to reduce vulnerability, and thus multi-industry 
impacts. 
 
Figure 2.5. Network component importance measures across the Oklahoma economy 














































Figure 2.6 emphasizes component importance to individual industries, 
quantifying the proportional impact of a loss of component 𝑝 on a particular industry 
relative to the impact of a loss in all components on that industry, as calculated with Eq. 
(2.14). This measure lies on (0,1), where 𝜂 = 0 means that the removal of component 
𝑝 does not affect industry k, while 𝜂 = 1 suggests that the particular component 
removal completely shuts down industry k.  As it is shown in Figure 2.6, any failure that 
results in disconnection of link (2,5), the inland waterway connecting the Port of Catoosa 
to the Port of New Orleans, would have the largest impact on Food, beverages, and 
tobacco products (311) relative to other industries. The intermodal terminal (node 8), 
which connects the Port of Catoosa to its out-of-state customers through the North 
America railroad, has the largest impact on Petroleum and coal products (324). It also 
demonstrates that the malfunction of local railroads (e.g., link (2,8)) may have a high 
impact on the productivity of Petroleum and coal products (324). In addition, the 
Nonmetallic and mineral products (327) industry, primarily located in the Oklahoma City 
business economic area, is highly vulnerable to the functionality of the part of the North 
America railroad that connects Oklahoma City, OK with Chicago, IL. Note that some 
components are important from the perspective of a particular industry though perhaps 
not the entire economy, such as link (1,7), which suggests lower priority in Figure 2.5 but 
is quite impactful for the Nonmetallic and minerals products (327) industry. Figure 2.5 
also suggests that the Petroleum and coal products (324) industry can be impacted by the 




Figure 2.6. Network component importance measures focusing on particular 
Oklahoma industries using 𝜼𝒑
𝒌(𝑮, 𝐛). 
 
Transportation network vulnerability studies have largely attempted to quantify 
the reduction in system functionality, following a disruption, as (i) topological properties 
of the network, and (ii) flow importance measures. These structural and flow-related 
measures ignore a larger role that the transportation network plays in facilitating 
economic productivity. This work offers a broader perspective on freight transportation 
network vulnerability analysis with a means to measure importance of network 
components considering economic impacts of degradation of transportation network.  In 
particular, this study considers a multi-modal freight network consisting of highway, 
railway, and waterway transportation, and implements the proposed vulnerability analysis 
















A four-step approach (i) calculates baseline (undisrupted) multi-commodity flow 
according to minimum cost, (ii) measures slack at supply and demand nodes, in the form 
of undelivered supply and unmet demand, when individual components are removed 
(one-at-a-time) from the network according to a maximum flow perspective, (iii) relates 
slack in the network to perturbations and inoperability among interdependent industries 
relying on commodities flowing along the network, and (iv) quantifies the importance of 
each component from industry-specific and overall regional economy perspectives. The 
primary contribution of this approach is the integration of the multi-commodity network 
flow representation of the multi-modal transportation network with the interdependent, 
multi-industry economic model and a framework to measure a transportation network 
component importance considering its multi-industry impact. 
This approach is illustrated with a stylized case study of a multi-modal 
transportation network in the state of Oklahoma, where supply nodes are located within 
the state and demand nodes are located outside of the state. Results of the case study 
suggest that the Petroleum and coal products industry is particularly susceptible to 
disruptions in several components, and certain components can impact multiple 
industries. Also, analysis shows that the economy of the state and most industries are 
primarily vulnerable to the malfunction of the parts of the railway that connect the state 
to the North America railroad and major trucking corridors including interstate highways 
I-35, I-44, and I-40. While the application pursued in this study focused primarily on the 
state of Oklahoma, the base model can be applied to other freight transportation networks 
to identify the critical nodes/links that can instigate the largest vulnerability across 




model and its future applications could provide significant value to homeland security 
preparedness planning. 
Furthermore, the vulnerability analysis perspective proposed in this study can be 
implemented to highlight priorities in maintaining certain network components (to reduce 
common-cause failure), or in rerouting of commodity flows after a disruption. There also 
exists an opportunity to extend the base approach discussed in this work to analyze 
network completion strategies where capacity enhancement (e.g., link capacity) and 
additional transportation facilities (e.g., added links/nodes) could harden the network 
around the most vulnerable components. Further, longer term transportation 














INVESTING FOR ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY IN INTERDEPENDENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND INDUSTRY SECTORS 
 
 
Freight transportation infrastructure, including ports, intermodal stations, 
interstate highways, and railways as basic structures and facilities, enable commodity 
flows and facilitate the productivity of industries. In the past decades, numerous 
disruptive events, whether natural hazards, human-made events or common failures, have 
threatened the operation of multiple modes of this infrastructure system and consequently 
adversely impacted economic productivity. A few examples include flooding of the 
Mississippi and Missouri rivers in 1993, where several railroads experienced delays and 
cancelations (Haefner et al. 1996), Hurricane Katrina that caused damage to the American 
highway system in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in 2005 (Shen and Aydin 2014), 
and Hurricane Sandy, as a multi-storm which hit the East Coast of the US in 2012, that 
caused all port terminal facilities and the harbor closure at the Port of New York/New 
Jersey area (Fialkoff et al. 2017).  A local disruption (i.e., port closure) can have effects 
that propagate through the system of interdependent infrastructure and industry sectors 
resulting in major reductions in economic efficiency regionally or nation-wide (Pant et 
al. 2011, Arnold et al. 2006). A protective approach could include “hardening” key 
industries to lessen the shocks from disruptive events (DHS 2013). This work provides 




resilience from the perspective of a central decision maker across several interdependent 
industries.  
This work focuses on reducing vulnerability via absorptive capacity. The idea of 
absorptive capacity has also been referred to as static resilience, or “the ability of the 
system to maintain functionality when shocked” (Rose 2007). Mathematically, static 
resilience is measured in terms of the difference between the maximum potential drop in 
system performance and the estimated performance drop (Rose 2004). That is, no notion 
of recovery is considered, only the ability to withstand the initial disruption. This is 
depicted graphically in Figure 3.1 and mathematically in Eq. (3.1), where %ΔDY 
represents the actual percentage change in the performance of the system following a 
disruptive event and %ΔDYmax represents the maximum percentage change given the 
worst-case level of performance (Rose 2009). This quantitative approach is used in this 
study to define a performance measure for the system’s ability to absorb shocks 
(%ΔDYmax − %ΔD) from disruptive events, though we prefer the term absorptive 
capacity rather than static resilience. 
While Figure 3.1, from Pant et al. (2014), represents changes in system 
performance in a general sense, Rose (2009) provides a more specific application, where 
%ΔDY and %ΔDYmax refer to changes in total output produced in an economy of 
interconnected industry sectors. In this sense, these measures are analogous to the concept 
of inoperability, a well-studied topic in the literature of interdependent industries and 
infrastructures (Santos and Haimes 2004, Barker and Haimes 2009, Barker and Santos 
2010a,b). Inoperability, q, quantifies the proportional extent to which a system (e.g., 




to describe the behavior of a system regardless of the measure describing its proper 
function (e.g., flow capacity, connectivity, production output).   
 
 
Figure 3.1. The performance components of static resilience (Pant et al. 2014). 
 




   
(3.1) 
 
This chapter seeks to answer: how should limited resources can be allocated to 
harden individual industries effectively to enhance absorptive capacity with total 
economic impacts in mind? These economic impacts are realized due to freight 
disruptions. Freight transportation infrastructure disruptions lead not only to physical 
damage, but also to an interruption of economic productivity across multiple industries 
due to infrastructure inoperability (Ham et al. 2005, Park et al. 2011). Arnold et al. (2006) 
analyzed economic impacts of disruptions in container traffic in the ports of Los Angeles 




Model (IIM) (Santos and Haimes 2004), showed how a local disruption in the Port of 
Catoosa in Tulsa, OK, would affect multiple industry sectors within the state of Oklahoma 
and neighboring states that trade with Oklahoma. Understanding the absorptive capacities 
of affected industries could inform preparedness planning against impacts. In particular, 
preparedness plans could enhance the ability of the industry sectors to absorb shocks from 
the disruptive events and lessen the maximum economic inoperability that the series of 
interdependent industries would experience.  
This chapter establishes inoperability, through the IIM, as a means to measure 
absorptive capacity in interdependent industries. IIM is a data-driven model that contains 
uncertainties due to inherent linearity or proportionality assumptions and/or inexactness 
in data collection, allocation, and integration (Pant et al. 2011). This research addresses 
(i) defining a measure of absorptive capacity to invest for resilience in an interdependent 
economic system, and (ii) planning for absorptive capacity under uncertainty, while (iii) 
addressing some of the uncertainties of the model. 
The IIM is an extension of the economic input-output model (Leontief 1986), for 
which Wassily Leontief won a Nobel prize. The input-output model has been widely 
accepted as a useful model for analyzing the interdependent connections among 
industries. In a system of 𝑛 interacting industries under a static equilibrium, the total 
output of the ith industry is distributed to all other industries and also satisfies external 
demand. This equilibrium condition is described with 𝑥 =  ∑ 𝑧 +  𝑐 , where xi is the 
output, ci is the external demand for industry i, and zij describes the flow of commodities 




commodities zij is assumed to be proportional to the output of industry j, expressed as 
𝑧 =  𝑎 𝑥 . The common form of the Leontief input-output model is expressed in Eq. 
(2.1) where x is an 𝑛×1 vector of industry production outputs, A is an 𝑛×𝑛 industry-by-
industry matrix of interdependency coefficients, and c is a 𝑛×1 vector of final demands. 
The model shows that total production is made up to satisfy industry-to-industry 
intermediate production (Ax) and final demands (c). 
Instead of describing the connections between the interdependent industry sectors 
in terms of commodity flow in monetary units (e.g., dollars), the IIM illustrates how 
normalized production losses propagate through all interconnected industries. The IIM 
gives us inoperability as an alternative metric for examining the effects of a disruption.  
The IIM is provided in Eq. (2.3) (Santos and Haimes 2004), which describes the 
relationships among 𝑛 infrastructure and industry sectors, resulting in matrices of size 
𝑛×𝑛 and vectors of length 𝑛. 
As is evident from Eq. (2.3) the IIM, like the economic input-output model of Eq. 
(2.1), is a demand-driven model. Specifically in the IIM disruptions are translated to 
demand perturbations giving direct economic losses, following which the indirect 
economic losses can be estimated through Eq. (2.3). Total economic losses, the 
combination of direct and indirect losses, can be calculated by multiplying each industry’s 
production level by its inoperability level: for industry i, 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞 , or for the entire 
economy of industries, 𝑄 = 𝐱 𝐪.  As such, planning decisions can be made with respect 
to inoperability or economic impact at the sector level, or with respect to economic impact 





While the input-output model, and its inoperability-based extension, may appear 
to be overly simple in its linear construction, the validity of the model is attested for by 
the vast amount of literature in which it is used. In addition, there are detailed data sets 
available to support analysis with the model, including the commodity flow data 
published annually by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and many other 
countries worldwide. 
A disruption within a freight transportation infrastructure affects industries that 
rely on the operation of these facilities to move commodities. The disruption propagates 
through the interdependent system and causes regional and national economic 
inoperability. As discussed in Section 3.2, the interdependent economic impacts of the 
disruption is calculated using the IIM, and subsequently in Section 3.1, a measure of 
absorptive capacity is defined based on the concept of static economic resilience (Rose 
2009, Pant et al. 2014). We propose an optimization framework to devise a strategy to 
allocate limited budget to industry sectors to enhance the absorptive capacity. Epistemic 
data uncertainty in the IIM is considered and decision making under uncertainty is 
discussed. 
3.3.1 Defining Absorptive Capacity with Inoperability 
Suggested previously, the percentage change in the performance of a system, 
%ΔDY, is analogous to the measure of inoperability, q, which represents the proportional 
extent to which a system is not properly functioning. If we define qmax as the maximum 
possible inoperability that could be experienced after a disruptive event, a measure of 




with convention Я , adopting the Я notation of Whitson and Ramirez-Marquez (2009) as 
R often refers to reliability.   
Я =




Using the convention 𝐃⋆ = 𝑑⋆ = [𝐈 − 𝐀⋆] , Eq. (2.2) can be written as 𝐪 =
𝐃⋆𝐜⋆. As such, inoperability in sector i can be represented with Eq. (3.3). 
𝑞 = 𝑑⋆ 𝑐⋆ (3.3) 
 
As shown in Eq. (3.4), using the demand-driven paradigm, the absorptive capacity 
for sector i can be written as a function of maximum and expected demand perturbation 
levels, 𝑐 ,
⋆  and 𝑐⋆, respectively. Я  measures the proportional “savings” in 
inoperability when a priori planning can stave off the worst-case inoperability outcome 
in favor of reduced inoperability. 
Я =
∑ 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − ∑ 𝑑⋆ 𝑐⋆
∑ 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ =
∑ 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐⋆
∑ 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆  (3.4) 
 
To capture absorptive capacity across the entire set of interdependent 
infrastructure and industry sectors, a more appropriate economic resilience metric would 
account for the widespread ability of sectors to collectively maintain operability 
following a disruptive event. As such, individual sector inoperability is multiplied by 
sector output, in dollar terms.  In summation form, this is represented with 𝑄 =





∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − ∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐⋆
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆
=
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐⋆




3.3.2 Planning for Absorptive Capacity 
Resource allocation requires developing strategies that reduce demand 
perturbations effectively, thus leading to economic resilience. This demand-driven 
approach is consistent with the idea that static resilience (absorptive capacity) is a 
consequence of efficient utilization of resources and not system repair (Rose 2007).     
Assume that a disruptive event perturbs demand (perhaps directly, or perhaps as 
a forced demand reduction due to a supply shortage) in m ≤ n sectors. The worst-case 
demand perturbations in each of these m sectors is given by 𝑐 ,
⋆ , 𝑙 = {1, … , 𝑚}. The 
implementation of preparedness, or resilience-building, activities is concerned with 
reducing 𝑐 ,
⋆  through efficient resource allocation. If 𝑟  is a preparedness strategy 
adopted to reduce the initial sector 𝑙 demand perturbation impact, the effectiveness of 𝑟  
is measured in terms of the new resulting demand perturbation in Eq. (3.6). All sector 
demand perturbations are governed by Eq. (3.7). 
𝑐⋆ = 𝑓 𝑐 ,
⋆ , 𝑟  (3.6) 
 
𝑐⋆ =







Assuming a numerically higher value for 𝑟  results in a more effective 
preparedness strategy, some candidate graphical relationships between 𝑐⋆ and 𝑟  are 







Figure 3.2. Candidate functional relationships between 𝒄𝒍
⋆ and 𝒓𝒍.   
 
Since implementing preparedness strategies comes at a cost, there is a finite 
budget that governs the maximum possible values taken by 𝑟 . If 𝑔 (𝑟 ) expresses the cost 
of implementing strategy rl, then this budget as an upper bound. For the entire set of 
interdependent infrastructure and industry sectors, if at most budget b is available, then 
Eq. (3.8) is a constraint limits a fixed budget. 
𝑔 (𝑟 ) ≤ 𝑏 (3.8) 
 
The collection of Eqs. (3.5), (3.6), and (3.8) results in the resource allocation 








∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐⋆
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐⋆ = 𝑓 𝑐 ,
⋆ , 𝑟 , ∀𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑚}
𝑔 (𝑟 ) ≤ 𝑏
𝑟 ≥ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑚}
 (3.9) 
 
Eq. (3.9) represents a generalized formulation of the resource allocation to 
maximize absorptive capacity. The functional forms of 𝑓 (·) and 𝑔 (·) govern the solution 
to the absorptive capacity planning problem. For macro-level planning, the 𝑟  value might 
denote the amount of capital that can be invested in purchasing and substituting for the 
lost demand 𝑐⋆.  If the exponentially decreasing functional form (the dotted line in Figure 
3.2) is assumed, Eq. (3.10) would govern how planning for absorptive capacity can 
improve 𝑐⋆, where 𝛼  is a measure of the effectiveness of investment 𝑟 , which also shows 
the return for substituting for lost demand for sector l.  
𝑐⋆ = 𝑐 ,
⋆ 𝑒  (3.11) 
 
For this special case, the absorptive capacity planning optimization problem can 
be written as Eq. (3.12), given that Eq. (3.11) is a strict equality constraint. Note that 𝑟  
represents an investment made to improve absorptive capacity, therefore the sum of 𝑟  
must satisfy the budget constraint. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐 ,
⋆ 𝑒
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑟 ≤ 𝑏






Decision makers with interdependent economic impacts in mind, planning for 
absorptive capacity to harden industries facing human-made or natural disasters, must 
consider the uncertainty of the decision making environment (e.g., relationships among 
industries after a disruption). Uncertainty resulting from imperfect and/or unknown 
information can be characterized by: (i) inexactness, (ii) unreliability and (iii) ignorance. 
All of these could be caused by the lack of quality or appropriateness of data used as 
inputs to the model, an incomplete understanding of the modeled phenomena, and/or all 
omissions due to a lack of knowledge (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). Walker et al. (2003) 
provide a conceptual basis for a systematic treatment of uncertainty in model-based 
decision support activities such as policy analysis and risk assessment by defining three 
dimensions of uncertainty as the location of uncertainty (“where the uncertainty manifests 
itself within the model complex”), the level of uncertainty (“where the uncertainty 
manifests itself along the spectrum between deterministic knowledge and total 
ignorance”), and the nature of uncertainty (“whether the uncertainty is due to the 
imperfection of our knowledge or is due to the inherent variability of the phenomena 
being described”). The location of uncertainty refers to the logical structure of a generic 
system model within which various sources of uncertainty are classified as: (i) context in 
terms of identifying the boundaries of the system to be modeled, (ii) model uncertainty 
associated with both conceptual model and the analytical model, (iii) inputs to the model, 
(iv) parameters uncertainty, and (v) model outcome, as an accumulated uncertainty. The 
level of uncertainty, an expression of the scale of uncertainty, is defined as an entire 




to total ambiguity categorized as: (i) determinism, (ii) statistical uncertainty, (iii) scenario 
uncertainty, (iv) recognized ignorance, and (v) total ignorance. And, nature of uncertainty 
could be either related to limited and inaccurate data, measurement errors, incomplete 
knowledge, limited understanding, imperfect models, subjective judgement, or 
ambiguities, classified as epistemic uncertainty, or inherent uncertainty or randomness 
induced by variation associated with external input data, input functions, parameters, and 
certain model structures, categorized as aleatory (variability) uncertainty.  
In this work, data uncertainty in the integrated model in Eq. (3.12), consisting of 
data used to parameterize the IIM and resource allocation, is considered. As the 
coefficients of the 𝐀⋆ matrix derived from the technical coefficient matrix 𝐀, they are 
subject to uncertainties arising from the inter-industry data collection efforts by the BEA. 
The BEA collects annual input-output records for a group of 15 aggregated industries and 
more detailed records for 65 industries every five years. As the 𝐱 vector is derived from 
the same BEA data, it is prone to the same uncertainties as 𝐀⋆. Hence the economic input-
output model, and subsequently the IIM, is prone to uncertainties arising from 
parameterizing interdependency coefficients matrix 𝐀 (and 𝐀⋆)and 𝐱 vector of total 
output, due to statistical errors in compiling massive data bases and the variant nature of 
these parameters over time (Bullard and  Sebald 1977, West 1986). Barker (2008) and 
Barker and Haimes (2009) addressed uncertainty in the interdependency matrix 𝐀⋆ 
particularly in the IIM. The inexactness in quantifying the effectiveness of investments 
within the resource allocation model should also be recognized (MacKenzie and Zobel 




uncertainty in estimation of (i) the 𝐀⋆ matrix and magnitude of 𝐱 vector and (ii) 𝛼  as the 
measure of the effectiveness of investment 𝑟  in industry 𝑙. 
Bullard and Sebald (1977) studied inherent uncertainties in the coefficients of 𝐀, 
𝐱, and [𝐈 − 𝐀]  as bounded within a small interval of the published values. Similarly, 
our approach is to consider small random noises to model data point uncertainties in 𝐱 
and 𝐃⋆ = [𝐈 − 𝐀⋆] , whose elements are 𝑑⋆ . Furthermore, to model uncertainty in 
defining 𝛼 , the investment effectiveness for industry 𝑙, we propose probabilistic 
treatment considering the optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely estimates of 𝛼 .  
We propose a robust formulation of the optimization problem of Eq. (3.12). This 
robust formulation is shown in Eq. (3.13) , where D, X, and Ψ are uncertainty sets that 
contain all possible realizations of respective matrices and vectors. It is assumed that the 
sets D and X contain bounded random variations (e.g., ±5%) of the values of 𝐃⋆ and 𝐱, 
respectively. A triangular distribution represents the set ψ.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓
𝑠. 𝑡.
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐 ,
⋆ 𝑒
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ ≥ 𝑓
𝑟 ≤ 𝑏
𝑟 ≥ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚}
𝐷∗ ∈ 𝐷, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝛼 ∈ 𝛹
 (3.13) 
 
The non-linearity and stochasticity of the proposed model makes it difficult to 
solve analytically. As such, rather than guaranteeing a certain level of absorbability, being 
extremely conservative in Eq. (3.13), we want to make sure that the proposed model 
suggests a resource allocation set such that guarantees an absorbability that holds with 




optimization and has been widely used in “soft” robust optimization (Shapiro et al. 2009, 
Ben-Tal et al. 2009, Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000). The final formulation, presented in 
Eq. (3.14), is tractable using different simulation-based optimization solvers. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑓
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑃𝑟  
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ − 𝑐 ,
⋆ 𝑒
∑ ∑ 𝑥 𝑑⋆ 𝑐 ,
⋆ ≥ 𝑓 ≥ 1 − 𝜖
𝑟 ≤ 𝑏
𝑟 ≥ 0, ∀𝑙 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚}
𝐷∗ ∈ 𝐷, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝛼 ∈ 𝛹
 (3.14) 
 
The proposed planning model for absorptive capacity is applied to a case study of 
the Port of Catoosa in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The Port of Catoosa is connected to the U.S. 
inland waterway network through the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation 
System, a part of the Mississippi River Navigation System. There are approximately 70 
companies using the port and an annual freight volume of 2.2 million tons is sent and 
received through the port (US Army Corps of Engineers 2010, Commodity Flow Survey 
2010, Tulsa Port of Catoosa 2010). As defined by the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), 62 industries operate in Oklahoma, therefore the 𝐀⋆ 
matrix regionalized for Oklahoma is 62 × 62. This case study will focus on the six 
industries that are the port’s largest exporters (listed in Table 3.1) in terms of commodity 
flows due to high trade figures reported by Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2010). In 





Table 3.1. Six primary industries using the Port of Catoosa, along with their 
NAICS codes. 
Industry name NAICS code 
Food, beverage, and tobacco products  311 
Petroleum and coal products  324 
Chemical products  325 
Nonmetallic mineral products  327 
Machinery  333 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  339 
 
The exports through the Port of Catoosa contribute to the external demand of the 
industries in Oklahoma. As such, in case of a disaster at the port resulting in the loss of 
exports, there is a demand perturbation in the industries that use the port. Due to the 
interdependence among industries, the cascading of the demand perturbations causes 
losses to all the other state industries. Assuming that, in the case of a disruptive event, the 
only losses in the state economy are due to the loss of exports through the port, we can 
obtain estimates of the maximum demand perturbations, 𝑐 ,
⋆ , for the six primary 
industries using the port. These are found for each industry as the ratio of that industry’s 
mean estimate of exports to its total economic output, all provided in Table 3.2. It is 
further assumed that industries not using the port have zero demand perturbations, though 
could suffer from interdependent inoperability.  
Table 3.2. Maximum demand perturbation for the major industries using the Port 
of Catoosa in 2007 (output and exports given in million USD). 
Industry name Exports Output 𝑐 ,
⋆  
Food, beverage, and tobacco products  140.0  5578.5  0.0251  
Petroleum and coal products  57.0  12644.0  0.0045  
Chemical products  89.0  1327.3  0.0671  
Nonmetallic mineral products  3.0  2026.2  0.0015  
Machinery  108.0  7174.4  0.0151  
Miscellaneous manufacturing  6.0  746.6  0.0080  
 
A policy maker caring about the economy of the state of Oklahoma may seek a 




planning for absorptive capacity to avoid the maximum demand perturbation during the 
port closure. Depending on the industry faced with the disruptive event, this resource 
could describe: (i) maintaining additional inventory to maintain productivity, and (ii) 
setting short-term coordination contracts with distributors to be ready for alternative 
transportation modes other than the port. 
The model assumes that allocating resources reduces the impact exponentially. 
As more resources are allocated to an industry, the impacts on an industry decline at a 
constantly decreasing rate, and investing an additional dollar to reduce risk returns less 
benefit than investing the first dollar. For each directly impacted industry, the exponential 
function, shown in Eq. (12) requires estimating an investment effectiveness parameter, 
𝛼 . This parameter can be assessed if 𝑟 , the amount of resources needed to reduce the 
direct impacts on industry 𝑙 by a fraction 𝑐⋆/𝑐 ,
⋆ ,  is known or can be estimated, since 
𝛼 = −
 ( ⋆/ ,
⋆ )
. While the value of 𝛼  is always non-zero and positive with no upper 
bound, it is expected that 𝛼  would be small for large-scale disruptions where millions of 
dollars are necessary to reduce the impact. 
Table 3.3 lists parameter estimates for the effectiveness of investments, 𝛼 , in 
planning for absorptive capacity in different industries considering the consequences on 
reducing the maximum demand perturbation by 50%, i.e., setting 
⋆
,
⋆ = 0.5. Food and 
beverage products would be affected dramatically by the closure of the Port of Catoosa 
considering estimates for the cost per ton-mile for a barge at $0.97, compared to $2.53 
for rail, and $5.35 for trucking (Arkansas Waterway Commissions 2014), together with 




on average $7 million USD should be invested to avoid the maximum demand 
perturbation in this industry by 50%. Direct impacts for Petroleum and coal products is 
much less than Food and beverage products, but the nature of this industry’s products 
makes it difficult to look for alternative transport modes. And long-term investments in 
increasing domestic demand by developing refining facilities, pipelines, and alternate 
transportation infrastructures could be effective and result in a higher absorptive capacity. 
As such, 𝛼  is calculated assuming that an almost $5 million USD investment is needed 
to decrease the maximum demand perturbation in petroleum industries by half. The 
investment effectiveness for the other four industries are estimated considering the 
maximum loss in each industry and the options to increase the absorptive capacity with 
potential contracts for alternative transportation modes.  
Table 3.3. Estimates for the cost-effective parameter 𝜶𝒍 (given as per million USD). 
𝑙 Industry name 𝛼  
1 Food, beverage, and tobacco products  0.0460 
2 Petroleum and coal products  0.0631 
3 Chemical products  0.3419 
4 Nonmetallic mineral products  0.2014 
5 Machinery  0.0836 
6 Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.4257 
 
3.4.1 Planning for Absorptive Capacity 
The proposed model in Eq. (3.12) is implemented to optimize the budget 
allocation among the six important industries that trade through the Port of Catoosa. Four 
different total budget amounts are considered for allocations across the six industries: $10 
million, $20 million, $30 million, and $40 million, all in USD.  
Table 4 shows the results from solving Eq. (3.12), in terms of the budgets 𝑟  




whole interdependent economy: (i) at the smallest budget allocation of $10 million most 
of the resources are distributed to Miscellaneous manufacturing (339) and Chemical 
products (325); (ii) as the budget allocation is increased towards $40 million the resources 
get distributed towards Food and beverage and tobacco products (311) and Machinery 
(333); and (iii) Petroleum and coal products (324) comparatively require some resource 
allocations when budgets are increased to $30 million and beyond; (iv) Nonmetallic 
mineral products (327) comparatively require very little resource allocations. These 
results make sense as, based on Table 2 data, Food and beverage and tobacco products 
(311) and Machinery (333) are the two highest exporters through the port, so to 
progressively maximize the absorptive capacity of the economy most of the budget 
allocations will be distributed towards restoring economic flows in these sectors.  
Miscellaneous manufacturing (339) and Chemical products (325) have high initial 
resource allocation values because their cost effectiveness parameters 𝛼  from Table 3 
are high. But this means these is a fast stabilization of absorptive capacities in these 
sectors at the initial investment of $10 million, and subsequently these sectors requires 
smaller increments of the resource allocations to further maximize the absorptive capacity 
of the economic system. Table 3.5 confirms the above, as indicated by the values of the 
absorptive capacities of individual sectors as budget allocations are increased. 
Also shown in Table 3.5 are the values of the total economic losses avoided and 
the level of absorptive capacity achieved (value of the objective function of Eq. (3.12)) 
corresponding to each level of budget allocation. First we see that if no budget allocations 
were made then there is an economic loss of $69.3 million USD to the six industries, 




Overall the whole economy has a loss of $146.6 million. These results show the 
interdependent effects of the IIM. A budget allocation of $10 million results in decreasing 
economic losses by $37.9, which is a 25.8% restoration of absorptive capacity. Similarly 
a budget allocation of $40 million decreases the economic losses by $84.8, thereby 
restoring absorptive capacity by 57.8%.  
We note from the Table 3.5 results that for every subsequent $10 million 
increment of budget allocation results in diminishing returns in terms of the value of 
economic loss avoided or absorptive capacity restored. For example, from Table 5 as 
budget allocation is increased from $10 million to $20 million the changes in total loss 
avoided is $19.8 million, whereas an increment of budget allocation from $30 million to 
$40 million results in changing the amount of losses avoided by $12.2 million. Hence the 
decision maker has to make a tradeoff between increasing budget allocations and the 
amount of changing in losses avoided. A point to stop would be when the increment in 
budget allocation is more than the value by which the loss is reduced.               
As shown in Table 3.4, allocating absorptive capacity to Nonmetallic mineral 
products (327) is not as beneficial as investing money in the five other industry, and if 
the total budget is $20 million dollars or less, the policy maker should not devote any 
resources to Petroleum and coal products (324). Also, by increasing the total budget limit, 
a smooth increase in the amount of resources should be invested in Miscellaneous 
manufacturing (339) and Chemical products (325). On the other hand, there are varied 
ascending/descending trends in the percentage of incremental investment devoted to Food 





Table 3.4. Resource allocation for absorptive capacity in different industries (in 
million USD). 
Industry name 
Resources allocated to each industry for each total 
budget 
10 20 30 40 
Food, beverage and tobacco 
products  
0.307 5.885 10.952 14.917 
Petroleum and coal products  0.000 0.000 0.917 3.807 
Chemical products  3.879 4.630 5.311 5.845 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Machinery  2.784 5.853 8.640 10.822 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  3.029 3.632 4.179 4.608 
 
As shown in Figure 3.3 and the complementary Table 3.4, investment of $30 
million to harden the five industry sectors among the six most important to the port can 
avoid the maximum economic loss in Oklahoma by up to 50%, and it indirectly protects 
Nonmetallic mineral products (327) though the policy maker does not devote resources 
directly to this industry. Further, for example, nearly $40 million in economic losses 
across the Oklahoma economy can be avoided with a $10 million investment in 




















Proportion of economic loss avoided for each 
total budget 
10 20 30 40 
Food, beverage, and 
tobacco products  
25.897 
0.019 0.240 0.398 0.499 
Petroleum and coal 
products  
12.589 
0.070 0.090 0.151 0.292 




0.090 0.164 0.219 0.259 




0.588 0.675 0.738 0.781 
Total economic loss 146.6268 108.738 88.8825 73.984 61.7947 
Total economic loss 
avoided 
- 37.9 57.7 72.6 84.8 




Figure 3.3. Economic loss for each of the six industries and Oklahoma for each 
























Figure 3.4 shows the extent to which each industry sector and the Oklahoma 
economy are able to absorb shocks from a port disruption by allocating a defined amount 
of budget to harden the most important industry sectors in the area. 
3.4.2 Planning for Absorptive Capacity 
Discussed in Section 3.3, epistemic uncertainty in estimating (i) the 𝐀⋆ matrix and 
magnitude of 𝐱 vector, and (ii) 𝛼  as the measure of the effectiveness of investment 𝑟  in 
industry 𝑙, should be accounted for in this study. In this case study, small amounts of 
perturbations are considered to model data uncertainties in 𝐱 and 𝐃⋆ = [𝐈 − 𝐀⋆] , whose 
elements are 𝑑⋆ . It is assumed that the elements insets 𝑋 and 𝐷 related to the six industry 
sectors contain bounded random variations to the amount of ±5% of the (deterministic) 
values of 𝐱 and 𝐃⋆, respectively. Furthermore, a probabilistic treatment considering the 
optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely estimates of 𝛼  with a triangular distribution is 
assumed to model uncertainty in the investment effectiveness for industry 𝑙. The 
parameters of these triangular distributions are shown in Table 3.6. We model the 
uncertainty in this problem using Frontline Solvers, an optimization and simulation 
application for Microsoft Excel. 
Table 3.6. Probabilistic treatment estimating the cost-effective parameter 𝜶𝒍. 
𝑙 Industry name 
𝛼  
Min Mode Max 
1 Food, beverage, and tobacco products 0.0240 0.0460 0.0570 
2 Petroleum and coal products  0.0400 0.0631 0.0700 
3 Chemical products  0.1000 0.3419 0.4000 
4 Nonmetallic mineral products  0.0900 0.2014 0.3000 
5 Machinery  0.0600 0.0836 0.0900 





Table 3.7, which summarizes the solutions of Eq. (3.13), shows how epistemic 
data uncertainty, simulated with 1000 replications, affects the total economic losses 
resulting from each total budget. The differences between 5th and 95th percentiles of 
simulated results is 9 to 12 U.S. million dollars, in the cases of the four different budget 
limits. Hence, it is desired to consider the data uncertainty in decision making for 
allocating the limited budget to harden the six industry sectors within the state of 
Oklahoma. As the standard deviation shows, in the four simulated cases in Table 3.7, the 
amount of variation or data dispersion due to the uncertainty is at least $3 million, 
highlighting the importance of accounting for uncertainty in decision making.   
Implementing the proposed soft-robust optimization model in Eq. (3.14), 𝜀 =
0.05 is considered to guarantee an absorbability that holds with probability of (1 − 𝜀 =
95%). Comparing (i) the resource allocation resulting from the data uncertainty shown 
in Table 3.8, with (ii) the results from the deterministic model shown in Table 3.4, the 
allocation differences are generally less than 10%. Some exceptions include Food and 
beverage and tobacco products (311), which experiences a 100% decrease when the total 
budget is 10 million and subsequently has lesser budget allocations compared to the Table 
3.4 values. Similarly Petroleum and coal products (324), encounters decreases in 
allocated resources and that varies for different total budget amounts. Comparatively 
Chemical products (325), Miscellaneous manufacturing (339), and Machinery (333) see 
increases in budget allocations in that order. These changes, though small, show how 
uncertainty can alter the resource allocations.  Figure 3.4 shows the 95% confidence 
interval estimates for total losses in the Oklahoma economy expected when the each total 




Table 3.7. Probabilistic treatment estimating the cost-effective parameter 𝜶𝒍. 
 
 

































































































111.4919 2.9967 107.2106 116.9517 93.2697 3.2179 88.5499 99.0821 
  
Deterministic  108.738 Deterministic  88.8825 
 
 
































































































78.9276 3.5978 73.5014 85.4518 67.1443 3.7872 61.5286 73.7444 
  







Table 3.8. Resource allocation for absorptive capacity in different industries 
considering uncertainty (in million USD). 
Industry name 
Resources allocated to each industry for each total budget 
10 20 30 40 
Food, beverage, and tobacco 
products  
0 5.344 10.712 14.562 
Petroleum and coal products  0 0 0.231 3.071 
Chemical products  4.102 4.964 5.830 6.433 
Nonmetallic mineral products  0 0 0 0 
Machinery  2.708 5.844 8.730 10.983 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  3.191 3.848 4.498 4.952 
Total budget 10 20 30 40 
 
 
Figure 3.4. 95% confidence interval estimates of total economic loss under 
different budget limits, million USD. 
 
Measure of the effectiveness of investment 𝛼  is considered to monitor the effects 
of changes in the data uncertainty on budget allocation. Figure 3.6 illustrates the changes 
in the resulting allocated budget to each industry when the interval in probabilistic 
treatment of 𝛼  is increased by 25%, 50%, and 75%. These three incremental levels of 
uncertainty are deployed by changing the upper and lower limits shown in Table 3.6 while 



























comparing with the results of the deterministic model, for different budget limits, are 
plotted.  
  
(a) total budget of $10 million (b) total budget of $20 million 
  
(c) total budget of $30 million (d) total budget of $40 million 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of changes in budget allocation with increasing interval 
width (25%, 50%, 75%) for the probabilistic treatment of the investment 
effectiveness parameter 𝜶𝒍. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.5 different behavior in percentage of the changes in 
allocating budget to the six industries are monitored based on the total budget limits and 
the magnitude of the change in the uncertainty interval. For example, significant 
decreases are seen in the budget that should be allocated to Food and beverage and 
tobacco products (311) when the total budget is less than $20 million, which is 
comparable to the results from the deterministic model. Smooth changes are seen for the 
































Petroleum and coal products (324) when the total budget limit is more than $20 million, 
where an increase in the uncertainty interval decreases the budget that should be allocated. 
In general, it can be seen that the larger uncertainty interval for investment effectiveness 
caused more changes in budget allocation for higher budget limits. 
Freight transportation infrastructure plays an important role as a facilitator of 
economic productivity by connecting industries from multiple regions. Large-scale 
disruptive events can cause failures within the system that propagate through the multiple 
interconnected industries. Investing in hardening both the infrastructure (e.g., backup 
equipment) and industries themselves (e.g., on-hand inventory) can lessen the effects of 
disruptions. The interdependent nature of industries must be considered when considering 
such resource allocation. This work discusses a modeling and analysis framework to 
allocate limited resources to harden industry sectors to enhance the absorptive capacity 
of the total economy.  
The interdependent adverse effects of a disruption are measured using a risk-based 
interdependency model and an exponential resource allocation model is introduced to 
formulate the risk reduction. Considering the three components of resilience capacity 
identified by Vugrin and Camphouse (2011) and the notion of static resilience proposed 
by Rose (2009), a measure of absorptive capacity as the ability of the system to absorb 
the effects of a disruption is proposed. Finally, in an integrated optimization model, it is 
sought to maximize the whole system absorbability by allocating a limited budget to 




interdependency model has been considered and a soft-robust optimization model is 
developed to help policy makers to allocate resources under uncertainty. 
The proposed modeling and analysis framework is implemented in case study 
developed based on the six important industries at the Port of Catoosa that use the inland 
waterway to send out commodities to their consumers out of the state of Oklahoma. 
Results show how increasing the budget limit affects allocated budget to each industry. 
Though Miscellaneous manufacturing (339) and Chemical products (325) receive the 
largest share with the $10 million budget, Food and beverage and tobacco products (311) 
and Machinery (333) receive the largest share as the budget allocation is increased to $40 
million. It has been seen that considering bounded random variations to the amount of 
±5% of the (deterministic) values of 𝐱 and 𝐃⋆ together with a probabilistic treatment 
considering the optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely estimates of 𝛼  causes dramatic 
variation in the economic loss considering the allocated budget. Also, analysis on the 
measure of effectiveness showed that when the interval in the probabilistic treatment of 
𝛼  is increased by 25%, 50%, and 75%, the changes in the allocated budget varies in 
different budget limits. For example, While Food and beverage and tobacco products 
(311) experienced a significant decrease in the allocated budget when the total budget is 
less than $20 million, it faces at most a 30% decrease when the total budget is $40 million. 
The proposed model can be implemented in a network of freight infrastructure 
and the multi-regional impacts of the disruption can be considered in both modeling the 








PLANNING FOR ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
 
The use of the term “resilience” has increased substantially in the literature in 
recent years (Mattson and Jenelius 2015, Hosseini et al. 2016, Kamalahmadi and Parast 
2016), recognizing a shift in planning from prevention and protection to preparing for the 
inevitability of disruption. Several qualitative and quantitative frameworks being 
proposed to describe the resilience of a system (e.g., Patterson et al. (2006), Zobel (2011), 
Sarre et al. (2014)). While most definitions of resilience recognize the time-dependent 
nature of withstanding and recovering from a disruption, Rose (2004) defined static 
resilience as “the ability of an entity or system to maintain function when shocked.” This 
is depicted in Figure 4.1, where %ΔDYmax represents the maximum percentage change 
given the worst-case level of performance following a disruptive event, and %ΔDY 
represents the actual percentage change in the performance of the system (assuming the 
implementation of a mitigation strategy) (Rose 2009). The original application of static 
resilience, as well as several subsequent studies (e.g., Rose (2007, 2009), Rose and Wei 
(2013), Hallegatte (2014), Pant et al. (2014), Baghersad and Zobel (2015)), deal with 
economic disruption. Mathematically, static resilience is measured in terms of the 
maximum potential drop in system performance and the estimated performance drop, as 
shown in Eq. (4.1). This quantitative approach is used in this study to define a 
performance measure for post-disaster rerouting, though we prefer the term adaptive 














Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2015) thoroughly review the literature on 
transportation system performance considering disruptions to physical infrastructure. 
Defining a four-phase disaster life cycle as (i) mitigation, (ii) preparedness, (iii) response, 
and (iv) recovery, they suggest that most work focuses on assessing the transportation 
system’s ability to deal with disruption consequences, with less work assessing strategies 
to manage the system after the disruption. Further, the literature that seeks rerouting 
strategies to mitigate the effects of disruption by maintaining freight flow through a 
residual network is sparse (Khaled et al. 2015, Gedik et al. 2014). And, to the author’s 
knowledge, the approach proposed here to reroute flow and plan for adaptive capacity by 
considering the contribution of transportation network components to multi-industry 
impacts is non-existent in the literature. To address this gap in the literature, we propose 




network to decrease the effect on local industries requiring those commodities for 
production. To do so, we combine a multi-commodity network flow formulation of a 
multi-modal transportation network with a risk-based multi-industry impact model in an 
integrated formulation.  
A disruption within a freight transportation network affects its vital role in 
transporting raw materials among manufacturers and final products between 
manufacturers and consumers. Such a disruption in the flow of commodities leads to 
economic losses across multiple industries. To devise an adaptive capacity strategy (i.e., 
post-disruption rerouting) to lessen total economic losses following a disruption, we 
propose an optimization framework that integrates (i) a multi-commodity network flow 
model of freight movement, (ii) a risk-based interdependency model of multi-industry 
impacts, and (iii) an objective function that addresses adaptive capacity with a measure 
of static economic resilience (Rose 2009, 2013, Pant et al. 2014b). The proposed 






Figure 4.2. Three-step approach to planning for adaptive capacity with multi-industry 
impacts. 
 
4.2.1 Freight Movement and Disruption 
From a tactical point of view, integrating (i) industries and (ii) their supply 
capabilities or demand requirements together with (iii) the structure of the transportation 
network, can result in a minimum cost MCNF model that can route commodities from 
suppliers to demand nodes via 𝑓 , collectively representing the flow of commodities on 
the links of a baseline (undisrupted) network. Natural hazards, human-made events, or 
common failures could threaten the functionality of the network components and 
consequently interrupt commodity flows. The consequences of a hazards, attacks, or 
failures are simulated as disruptions in the flow of valuable goods or services through the 
network caused by disabling network components. The functionality of the network is 
analyzed to determine how vulnerable it is to interdiction, and which nodes or links, if 




a wide range of possible disruptions that may vary with respect to spatial scales, 
correlation of disruptive events, sequence of failures, and event duration. 
In the case of any disruption modeled as the removal of a network component or 
a set of components (or a drop in functionality of the network modeled as reduction of 
link capacities, 𝑢 ), the consequences are sought by deducting the commodity flows on 
the affected links from the baseline flow. Let 𝐺 = (𝑁′, 𝐿′) represent the network after 
disruption with updated sets of links, 𝐿  and nodes, 𝑁′. The sets 𝑁 , 𝑁 , 𝑁   denote the 
post disruption sets of nodes associated with home of consumers, home of suppliers, and 
transshipment nodes, respectively. The quantity of commodity 𝑘 at node 𝑖 that is either 
undelivered and remaining with the suppliers, or unsatisfied demand of consumers, is 
reflected in the slack variable 𝑆 . This slack variable will be used subsequently to drive 
the calculation of inoperability among multiple industries. It is assumed that each type of 
commodity represents the output of a lone industry, and interdependent inoperability 
propagated through a set of industries caused by unsatisfactory demands/supplies will be 
modeled in the next section.  
  4.2.2 Multi-industry Impact 
In this work, we use an extension of the input-output economic model, for which 
Wassily Leontief (1966) won a Nobel Prize, to capture the multi-industry impacts of 
unmet demands at demand nodes and remaining commodities at supply nodes as the result 
of a disruption to components of the transportation network. In addition to industry 
inoperability, a traditional economic loss metric can be calculated by multiplying each 
industry’s production level, 𝑥 , in dollars, by its inoperability level: for industry 𝑘, 𝑄 =




As such, decisions to plan for adaptive capacity can be made with respect to economic 
impact across multiple industries. 
  4.2.3 Planning for Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity is considered to be the extent to which a freight transportation 
network is capable of facilitating economic productivity by the (short-term) rerouting of 
commodities through the residual network to reduce remaining commodities at suppliers 
and unsatisfied demand at consumers. Inoperability in industry 𝑘 is calculated with Eq. 
(2.2), and economic losses for industry 𝑘 can be found by multiplying the proportional 
inoperability by expected production level in monetary units, 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞 . Economic 
losses for the entire set of industries is calculated with 𝑄 = 𝐱 𝐪. As such, inoperability 
or economic impact at the industry level, or total economic impact at the across all 
industries, can be used to valuate strategies for strengthening adaptive capacity. Proposed 
in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) are two such metrics motivated by Eq. (4.1). 
When planning emphasis is placed on a particular industry (i.e., rerouting freight 
in the transportation network to reduce the impact to industry 𝑘), Eq. (2.2) is proposed to 
valuate a strategy to strengthen adaptive capacity. Term Я  is a proportional measure 
involving (i) the economic loss, 𝑄 , experienced by a particular industry 𝑘 following 
disruptive event 𝑒 when no adaptive capacity planning is taken and (ii) the economic loss, 
𝑄 , in industry 𝑘 when a strategy is taken to avoid the maximum economic loss in that 
particular industry.  








For a perspective that spans all industries, Eq. (2.3) provides a similar proportional 
metric, where 𝑄  is the multi-industry economic loss caused by disruption 𝑒 in the 
baseline case, and 𝑄  is the multi-industry loss when a rerouting strategy is taken to avoid 
the maximum economic loss.  





Assuming a multi-industry perspective and considering a hypothetical decision 
maker interested in limiting economic losses across multiple industries, Eq. (4.3) serves 
as the objective function in the following optimization framework that integrates the 
multi-commodity network flow model from Section 4.2.1 and the Inoperability Input-
Output Model from Section 4.2.2 Following a particular disruption 𝑒 that affects a 
particular set of transportation links, the proposed model in Eqs. (4.4)-(4.12) seeks to 
optimally reroute the flow of commodities through the residual network such that a 
measure of static economic resilience is minimized. Here, it is assumed that the result of 
the model provides decision makers with a rerouting strategy across different modes. The 
period of disruption is assumed to be sufficiently long enough to employ intermodal 
container scheduling models (e.g., Lee and Kim (2010), Wang and Yun (2013)) to devise 
operational-level plans based on the resulted contingent rerouting strategy in the 
simplified static supply-demand network. Notation employed in the problem formulation 
is summarized as follows, noting that network variables (e.g., the sets of links and nodes) 







𝐿  set of links  𝑁′ set of nodes  
𝑁  set of nodes related to industry k 𝑢  capacity of link (𝑖, 𝑗) after disruption 
𝑁  set of transshipment nodes 𝑞  inoperability of industry k 
𝑁  set of nodes that are home to 
consumers 
𝑁  set of nodes that are home to 
consumers in the region of interest 𝛼 
𝑁  set of nodes that are home to 
suppliers 
𝑁  set of nodes that are home to suppliers 
in the region of interest 𝛼 
𝛾  intermediate variable to keep the 
slack at node i positive 
𝑏  mass-balance variable representing 
demand/supply/transshipment at node 
i after disruption 
𝜇  binary coefficient with value 0 
when no unsatisfied demands at 
demand nodes and 1 when at least 
one demand node with unsatisfied 
needs 
𝑆  slack variable that captures 
undelivered commodity k remaining 
with the supplier node i or unsatisfied 
demand at demand node i 
𝑎⋆  elements of the normalized 
interdependency matrix 𝐀⋆ 
𝑐⋆ final consumption perturbation for 
industry k  






𝑓  integer variable represents the 
flow of commodity 𝑘 across link 














Based on this notation, planning for adaptive capacity by rerouting the flow of 
commodities through the residual network is formulated as follows.  
max  Я  (4.4) 
s.t. 𝑓 ≤  𝑢  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿   (4.5) 
 𝑓
( , )∈ 
− 𝑓
( , )∈ 





       
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
 (4.7) 
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 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞        (4.11) 
 
𝑓 ≥ 0  ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿 , 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 
𝜇  ∈  {0, 1},  𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 
(4.12) 
 
The formulation implements the idea of planning for adaptive capacity in a 
disrupted transportation network where the residual active network is presented by 𝐺 =
(𝑁′, 𝐿′), with updated sets of links, 𝐿′, and nodes, 𝑁′. The bundle constraint in Eq. (4.5) 
ties together the commodities by restricting the total flow of all the commodities on each 
link (𝑖, 𝑗) to at most 𝑢 , the capacity of that particular link after disruption. 𝑓  represents 
the flow of commodity 𝑘 across link (𝑖, 𝑗) which remains in the updated set of links, 𝐿 . 
Eq. (4.6) represents mass balances on each node, where 𝑏  captures demand/supply at 
each node in the residual network. A slack variable 𝑆  is defined to capture undelivered 




magnitude of 𝑆  is positive, and multiplier 𝛾  takes on a negative value for set of demand 
nodes (after disruption) 𝑁 , a positive value for supply nodes (after disruption) 𝑁 , and 
zero for transshipment nodes (after disruption) 𝑁 , as shown in Eq. (4.7). Eqs. (4.8)-(4.10) 
are constraints that translate remaining commodities at supply nodes and unsatisfied 
demand at demand nodes (in the geographical area of interest, α) into multi-industry 
inoperability. Here, 𝑐⋆ transfers remaining commodities of type 𝑘 at the supplier and/or 
unsatisfied demands, 𝑆 , into a final consumption reduction from Eq.(4.2) with respect 
to the total output of that particular commodity, representing the total output of industry 
k, 𝑥 .  Considering 𝑁  as set of nodes related to industry k (in the residual network), 
which either supply or demand commodity k, in Eq. (4.8), 𝑞  is added to capture the 
consequences of unsatisfied demand at nodes within the region on the inoperability of 
that industry, reasoning that any disruption leading to unsatisfied demands has an impact 
on the output of that particular industry which needs to be taken care of in the total 
interdependent inoperability. As the network might connect industries within the region 
of interest into their suppliers or customers out of the geographical area of interest, it is 
desired to consider the effect of failure in terms of remaining commodities at suppliers in 
the region of interest represented by 𝑁 ,  and unmet demand at demand nodes within the 
region of interest represented by 𝑁 . A binary coefficient, 𝜇 , in Eq. (4.8) takes on value 
0 when there are no unsatisfied demands at demand nodes within the region under study 
and 1 when there is at least one demand node with unsatisfied needs. Eq. (4.9) requires 
that 𝜇  be binary, defining a sufficiently large 𝑀. Eq. (4.10) implements the IIM to 
capture the adverse effect of the disruption in terms of remaining commodities at supply 




the failure devising a rerouting strategy are captured in Eq. (4.11) with total economic 
loss 𝑄 . And the objective function is the proportional economic saving, parametrized 
based on Eq. (4.3) in which 𝑄 , maximum economic loss experienced by the whole 
economy in the case of a disruption when no mitigating strategy is taken, is already 
calculated based on Section 4.2.1. and 4.2.2. The proposed approach benefits from the 
flexibility, scalability, and efficiency of the base MCNF paradigm with respect to 
optimization (Ahuja et al. 1993, Manfren 2012), as practiced in modeling 
interdependencies in critical infrastructure networks (e.g., Lee et al. (2007), Holden et al. 
(2013)). 
A multi-modal freight transportation network, consisting of three important 
interstate highways, railways, and inland waterways that connect to the Mississippi River 
Navigation System via two ports, plays an important role in transporting commodities 
produced in the business economic areas within the state of Oklahoma to consumers in 
neighboring states. A portion of this multi-modal freight transportation network is 
illustrated on a case study, described in Section 2.4, to implement the proposed model to 
improve adaptive capacity with a post-disruption rerouting strategy. A scenario-based 
disruption defined as the removal of a particular network component is considered in the 
illustrative example. Customers in surrounding states are considered to be four combined 
demand nodes connecting to Oklahoma’s multi-modal freight transportation network. 
The multi-industry impact of the disruption within the economy of the state of Oklahoma 




(short-term) strategy. The case study has been solved using optimization software 
LINGO, version 15. 
  4.3.1 Supply-Demand Network  
Based on the combined estimated annual supply and demand in tons for the 
associated industries and states compiled from different databases (US Army Corps of 
Engineers 2013, Tulsa Port of Catoosa 2013, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2010a,b, 
Port of Muskogee 2013, Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010), a list of monthly supply 
and demand is presented in Table 4.1 (assuming constant monthly demand, or annual 
demand divided by 12). 
Table 4.1. Combined monthly demands/supplies at supply/demand nodes 
connecting through the network (in tons). 
 Industry 
 311 324 325 327 333 339 
Supply nodes in OK       
Oklahoma City 362526 0 300501 183188 23790 118242 
Port of Catoosa 50244 454911 284685 25268 2470 424 
Port of Muskogee 0 33962 0 31886 0 30021 
Demand nodes outside of 
OK 
      
TX 97281 316905 204006 0 25838 30154 
LA 50244 18449 0 0 267 0 
AR 265245 153518 381180 41038 156 54494 
IL 0 0 0 199304 0 64039 
 
 
  4.3.2 Freight Movement and Disruption  
To parametrize the MCNF model, the cost vector is computed based on the 
transportation mode and the mileage of the distances between nodes: the per ton-mile for 
a barge is estimated at $0.97, compared to $2.53 for rail, and $5.35 for trucking (Arkansas 
Waterway Commissions 2014). The monthly capacity of each link, shown in Table 4.2 




commodities flowing on the link (ODOT 2013), representing the availability of 
transportation facilities. Assuming that the total supply of commodity 𝑘 is equal to the 
total demand of the same commodity throughout the network, as shown in Table 4.1, a 
baseline flow resulted in no remaining commodities at supply nodes and no unsatisfied 
demand at demand nodes when there is no disruption to the functionality of the network. 
 
Table 4.2. Link capacities among the origin/destination nodes in the illustrative 
network (ODOT 2013). 
Nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1    233333   241667  141667 516667  
2    15000 54167 62500 41667 283333  308333 112500 
3    29583 15417 250833  24167    
4            
5            
6            
7            
8    316667   25000     
9    150000       141667 
10      1000000      
11       133333  166667   
 
In the illustrative example, disruption scenarios are defined as the removal of a 
single network component at a time. It is assumed that a disruption, or the removal of a 
particular network component, lasts for a period of one month. Assuming that annual 
industry production accumulates consistently across the year (i.e., neither production nor 
interdependency relationships vary day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month), a 
smaller month-long time horizon is considered here as an appropriate proportion of a year 
to calculate the particular disruptive event cascading effect (e.g., a two-week closure of 
port facilities (Pant et al. 2011)). Shown in Table 4.3, three transshipment nodes within 




some segments of the North America Railroad, a local railroad which connects industrial 
parks to the North America Railroad, and parts of waterway system, were individually 
removed from the network to define the disruption scenarios. Focusing on the economy 
of the state of Oklahoma, and considering supply nodes within the state interacting with 
demand nodes in surrounding states, undelivered commodities remaining with suppliers 
or unsatisfied demand at demand nodes, as represented by 𝑆 , affect industry output and 
result in propagated inoperability through many of the interconnected industries. In the 
illustrative example, all the supply nodes are within the state of Oklahoma and the four 
demand nodes are located outside of Oklahoma. Table 4.3 reports ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) , the 
sum of the slack (remaining supply) by commodity at the supply nodes when different 
network components are disrupted, omitting the flow on the disrupted component from 
the baseline flow within the network. As shown in Table 4.3, the Petroleum and coal 
industry (324) is directly vulnerable in all disruption scenarios except for the loss of link 
(1,7), while the Food and beverage and tobacco industry (311) would be affected only 
by the loss of link (2,5). 




Sum of remaining commodities at supply nodes (tons) 
311 324 325 327 333 339 




0 0 19740 
 Node 8 0 263776 0 17509 2048 0 
Node 11 0 18960 71119 0 0 0 
Link (1,7) 0 0 0 177628 0 64039 
Link (9,11) 0 18960 71119 0 0 0 
Link (2,5) 50244 3656 0 0 267 0 
Link (8,4) 0 263776 0 0 2048 0 






  4.3.3 Multi-industry Impact  
As all the demand nodes are located outside of Oklahoma, failure in the form of 
the inability of suppliers to export commodities is modeled as a demand perturbation as 
calculated in Eq. (4.2). Other industries within the state will be affected by the 
interdependent effect of this failure, as captured by 𝑞 , representing the extent to which 
an industry output will not be produced. And the effect of the disruption on the economy 
of the state is captured by Q, assuming that industries not using the transportation network 
have not experienced any demand perturbation.  
Given the remaining commodities left at supply nodes, shown in Table 4.3, 
demand perturbation is calculated with Eq. (4.2). Resulting industry inoperability, 𝑞 , is 
provided in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 4.3. The Petroleum and coal industry (324) is 
most vulnerable to the removal of the link (2,8), link (2,4), or node 8.  The removal of 
these components also affect the operability of the Nonmetallic minerals industry (327), 
though to a lesser extent than the removal of link (1,7). The productivity of the Chemical 
products industry (325) is highly dependent on the connectivity of Tulsa and Oklahoma 
City through I-44, as represented by link (9,11), as well as transshipment nodes 9 and 11.  
Table 4.4. Industry inoperability across six most important industries within the 
state of Oklahoma. 
Removed component 
Industry 
311 324 325 327 333 339 
Node 9 0.00E+00 9.00E-04 4.90E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.50E-03 
Node 8 0.00E+00 1.16E-02 9.00E-04 1.20E-03 1.60E-03 8.00E-04 
Node 11 0.00E+00 9.00E-04 3.80E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 
Link (1,7) 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 8.90E-03 1.00E-04 4.50E-03 
Link (9,11) 0.00E+00 9.00E-04 3.80E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 
Link (2,5) 5.10E-03 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 2.00E-04 
Link (8,4) 0.00E+00 1.16E-02 9.00E-04 3.00E-04 1.60E-03 8.00E-04 






Figure 4.3. Graphical depiction of inoperability across six most important industries 
within the state of Oklahoma. 
 
Considering each industry’s production level in monetary value and calculating 
total impact of the disruption across the state’s industries with Q, Table 4.5 and Figure 
4.4 provide the supplementary analysis which elaborates the magnitude of loss (in million 
USD) experienced by different industries regarding the total economic loss. The 
interconnected nature of the industries within a region affect productivity of the other 56 
industries operating in Oklahoma though individually to a much lesser extent than the six 
industries directly affected. Many industries are vulnerable to any sort of disruption 
affecting the operability of node 8, the intermodal terminal facilities at the Port of 
Catoosa, or either of the links connecting it to nodes 2 or 4, the port itself and the state of 
Texas, respectively. The Petroleum and coal products industry (324) is a high dollar 
industry in Oklahoma affected the most by the disruption scenarios, though less 


















Figure 4.4. Interdependent economic losses in Oklahoma due to network component 
removal.            
 
  4.3.4 Planning for Adaptive Capacity 
During the month-long period of disruption, the efficacy of contingency rerouting 
through the residual network is determined according to its reduction in economic 
productivity of Oklahoma. Respectively, Table 6 and Table 7 report interdependent 
economic inoperability experienced by the six most important industries in Oklahoma 






Node 9 Node 8 Node 11 Link (1,7) Link
(9,11)




















impact 311 324 325 327 333 339 Others 
Node 9 0.12 11.04 6.67 0.09 0.20 14.77 17.59 50.47 
Node 8 0.24 146.24 1.22 2.47 11.90 7.95 159.32 329.33 
Node 11 0.04 10.80 5.16 0.06 0.11 0.78 12.82 29.79 
Link (1,7) 0.23 0.92 0.23 18.17 0.37 45.79 22.41 88.12 
Link (9,11) 0.04 10.80 5.16 0.06 0.11 0.78 12.82 29.79 
Link (2,5) 28.04 2.70 0.26 0.25 1.65 2.40 23.64 58.95 
Link (8,4) 0.24 146.20 1.21 0.69 11.88 7.88 158.46 326.56 




rerouting strategy devised from the model developed in Eqs. (4.4)-(4.12) to minimize Я . 
Я  is defined as a measure to lessen the maximum potential drop in the regional economy, 
lies on (0,1), where Я = 0 means that under a disruption scenario 𝑒, there is no way to 
avoid the maximum possible loss in the economy of the region by rerouting the supply-
demand network, and 𝜂 = 1 means that under a disruption scenario 𝑒, it is possible to 
maintain the full productivity of the regional economy by rerouting commodity flows 
through the residual network. Comparing the inoperability caused by the removal of the 
network component with and without devising a contingent rerouting strategy during the 
period of disruption, shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively, shows that the proposed 
model to plan for adaptive capacity tries to facilitate the trades in high dollar industries 
like Petroleum and coal products (324) and Miscellaneous manufacturing (339), while 
having less impact on Chemical products (325) or Food and beverage and tobacco (311) 
industries.  
Table 4.6. Economic inoperability caused by the disruption after devising a 




311 324 325 327 333 339 
Node 9 2.00E-04 0.00E+00 4.80E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Node 8 1.10E-03 7.20E-03 5.00E-03 8.00E-04 1.00E-04 5.00E-04 
Node 11 2.00E-04 0.00E+00 4.70E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Link (1,7) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 7.50E-03 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 
Link (9,11) 2.00E-04 0.00E+00 3.60E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Link (2,5) 0.00E+00 1.00E-04 1.50E-03 0.00E+00 2.00E-04 0.00E+00 
Link (8,4) 1.10E-03 7.20E-03 5.00E-03 2.00E-04 1.00E-04 5.00E-04 






Figure 4.5. Economic inoperability caused by the disruption devising a contingent 
rerouting. 
 
Figure 5 depicts how contingent rerouting would affect the maximum loss across 
multiple Oklahoma industries following the removal of the particular components. And, 
as listed in Table 4.7, this strategy could lessen the vulnerability of the whole system with 
respect to the removal of particular components like link (2,5) as part of the inland 
waterway network. It is also inferred that industries in Oklahoma are most vulnerable to 
disruptions that cause inoperability in (i) node 8, the intermodal terminal facilitates the 
movement of commodities in the industrial park of Port of Catoosa to out-of-state 
customers, (ii) link (8,4), a portion of railroad that connects Oklahoma to Texas City, TX, 
or (iii) link (2,8), a local railroad that connects the Port of Catoosa to the North America 
railroad intermodal terminal, as even rerouting cannot sufficiently enhance the 
performance the collective industries, as measured by Я , by more than 36%. As shown 













component will be avoided with a contingent rerouting strategy, as in some cases system 
performance improved up to 85%.  
Table 4.7. Economic losses, in million USD, within the state of Oklahoma after 






Я  311 324 325 327 333 339 Others 
Node 9 0.85 0.41 6.57 0.03 0.05 0.42 3.00 11.32 0.78 
Node 8 5.98 90.15 6.80 1.66 0.78 5.17 100.68 211.22 0.36 
Node 11 0.85 0.40 6.34 0.03 0.05 0.41 2.92 10.98 0.63 
Link (1,7) 0.02 0.37 0.11 15.26 0.10 0.58 7.33 23.78 0.73 
Link (9,11) 0.84 0.31 4.83 0.02 0.04 0.32 2.36 8.72 0.71 
Link (2,5) 0.02 1.82 2.06 0.02 1.43 0.30 3.28 8.92 0.85 
Link (8,4) 5.98 90.12 6.79 0.44 0.78 5.12 100.10 209.33 0.36 
Link (2,8) 8.42 87.77 7.09 0.45 0.78 5.21 99.48 209.22 0.37 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Total economic loss across all industries in Oklahoma, contingent rerouting 
versus no action. 
 
As a contingent rerouting strategy is sought considering the total economic impact 
embedded in Eq. (4.3) , priorities given to high-dollar industries and those with the 
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benefit of implementing the adaptive capacity planning strategy in the case of different 
disruption scenarios, there might be cases in which the rerouting strategy results in losses 
to particular industries. Figure 4.7 shows how contingent rerouting strategies affect 
different industries (in the form of box plots generated across the eight disruption 
scenarios). For example, the rerouting strategies taken following the eight different 
disruption scenarios would lessen the economic loss in Petroleum and coal products 
(324) industries by $25.46 million, on average, and at least $0.55 million, in the case of 
losing link (1,7). Overall, the Chemical products (325) and Food and beverage and 
tobacco (311) industries are most adversely impacted, as shown in Figure 4.7, because 
optimal contingency rerouting tends not to benefit these industries in favor of the larger 
economy, as shown in Figure 4.6. 
 








With regard to the three components of resilience capacity identified by Vugrin 
et al. (2011), most freight transportation network resilience studies focus on pre-
disruption prevention investments via absorptive capacity or post-disaster network 
restoration strategies via restorative capacity. And such is typically done by defining 
system performance as a measure related to the serviceability of the system (e.g., travel 
time/distance, flow, throughput) or a topological measure related to the network structure 
(e.g. centrality, connectivity, betweenness). This work, however, emphasizes adaptive 
capacity in the form of contingent rerouting strategies to manage the supply-demand 
network after a disruptive event to lessen the total economic impact.  
More specifically, this work proposes an optimization formulation to 
accommodate the flow through the residual network and maintain the productivity of the 
economy of the desired region by (i) integrating a multi-commodity network flow model, 
representing a multi-modal freight transportation network, with a risk-based economic 
interdependency model, to capture the propagation of the failure in a group of 
interconnected industries, and (ii) defining a measure of adaptive capacity to valuate 
rerouting strategies. The formulation provides a means to consider the final role of a 
freight transportation network as the facilitator within the economy in planning for 
adaptive capacity after a disruption.  
Part of a multi-modal freight transportation network connecting Oklahoma to 
surrounding states has been considered to develop a stylized case study in which supply 
nodes are located in the state of Oklahoma and demand nodes are located in surrounding 




formulation in Oklahoma when a scenario-based disruption disables a particular network 
component for a month. Results suggest a successful avoidance of maximum potential 
loss in high dollar industries such as Petroleum and coal products (324) and 
Miscellaneous manufacturing (339), and a consequent static resilience in the economy of 
the state, as the average maximum loss could be avoided by more than 50%. Though a 
proportion of the total economic impact has been considered to seek adaptive planning 
strategies in this study, further work should embed larger social and community impacts 
in the problem formulation. 
This initial formulation can be further improved by accounting for the real-world 
intermodal container planning considerations and other dynamic issues. Complementary 
models to plan for system resilience as a function of absorptive and restorative capacity, 
as well as the adaptive capacity-focused formulation proposed here, could more 
















PLANNING FOR RESTORATIVE CAPACITY 
 
This work focuses on enhancing network resilience via restorative capacity. Most 
work in infrastructure network recovery focuses on the restoration process as an effort to 
minimize unsatisfied demands in each time period. Nurre et al. (2012) introduce a design 
and scheduling formulation that maximizes the total weighted flow reaching to demand 
nodes in each time period of the recovery horizon. Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) propose 
restoring disrupted network performance as a function of satisfied demand in each time 
period of the restoration horizon from the perspective of network resilience. Sharkey et 
al. (2015) expand the model by Nurre et al. (2012) to recover interdependent 
infrastructure networks. In terms of optimizing network connectivity, Aksu and Ozdamar 
(2014) formulate a multi-vehicle problem to recover blocked links that are critical for 
maintaining network connectivity under limited recovery resources. Celik et al. (2015) 
also plan debris cleaning processes with the aim of recovering transportation network 
connectivity under uncertain nature of the problem. Kasaei and Salman (2016) propose 
an arc routing problem that reconnects network components within a recovery time 
horizon.  
Acknowledging that infrastructure networks do not exist for their own sake but 
serve society, particularly as a means to promote economic productivity, this work 
expands upon the recent literature in optimizing infrastructure network recovery via 
demand satisfaction or network connectivity to accounting for multi-industry economic 




productivity with the proportional value of the maximum loss that can be avoided by 
recovery decisions, adapted from Rose (2004). This is depicted graphically in Figure 5.1 
and mathematically in Eq. (5.1), where %ΔDY represents the economic loss given that 
some recovery action is taken and %ΔDYmax represents the maximum economic loss due 
to the disruption  while no action is taken. This quantitative approach is used in this study 
to define a performance measure for the system’s ability to restore its functionality 
(%ΔDYmax − %ΔD) after a disruptive. In this work %ΔDY and %ΔDYmax refer to 
changes in total output produced in an economy of interconnected industries. In this 
sense, these measures are analogous to the concept of inoperability, a well-studied topic 
in the literature of interdependent industries and infrastructures (Santos and Haimes 2004, 
Barker and Haimes 2009, Barker and Santos 2010a,b). Inoperability, q, quantifies the 
proportional extent to which a system (e.g., economic system) is not functioning in an as-
planned manner, thereby providing a metric to describe the behavior of a system 
regardless of the measure describing its proper function (e.g., flow capacity, connectivity, 
production output). As further discussed in Section 5.3., this measure of restorative 
capacity is extended to represent maximum loss that is avoided in each time period by 






Figure 5.1. The performance components of restorative capacity (adapted from Pant et 
al. (2014)). 
 





A multi-modal freight transportation network can be considered a facilitator of 
economic productivity as it enables the flow of commodities among industries located in 
multiple regions. Following a disruptive event, obstacles in commodity movement ripples 
throughout the interconnected industries, as input to one industry may be disrupted output 
from another industry, thus affecting the entire (regional) economy. As such, we seek 
recovery decisions that enable economic productivity across multiple industries. We 
propose an optimization framework to devise recovery decision by integrating (i) a multi-
commodity network flow model of freight movement, (ii) a risk-based interdependency 
model of multi-regional, multi-industry impacts, and (iii) an objective function that 




2013, Pant et al. 2014). The proposed optimization model is developed following a three-
step approach, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2. Three-step approach to devise network recovery with multi-regional, multi-
industry impacts. 
 
  5.2.1 Freight Movement and Disruption  
A typical MCNF model is used to represent a network of industries located in 
multiple regions. And, a scenario-based removal of network components known as 
interdiction (Murray et al. 2008) is a common theme in modeling and analysis of supply-
demand network disruption. Interdiction analyses encompass a wide range of possible 
disruptions that may vary with respect to spatial scales, correlation of disruptive events, 
sequence of failures, and event duration. In the case of any disruption modeled as the 
removal of a network component or a set of components (or a drop in the functionality of 
the network modeled as reduction of link capacities), the consequences are calculated by 
deducting the commodity flows on the affected links from the baseline flow. Slack 




undelivered and remaining with the suppliers or (ii) unsatisfied demand experienced by 
consumers. This slack variable will be used subsequently to drive the calculation of 
inoperability among multiple industries.  
  5.2.2 Multi-Regional, Multi-Industry Economic Impact 
To model the interdependent adverse effect of commodity flow disruption on 
multiple industry sectors located in different regions, we use a multi-regional extension 
of Inoperability Input-Output Model (IIM). The IIM is an extension of the traditional 
economic input-output model (Leontief 1986), a linear model of the commodity flows in 
a set of interconnected industries. This section provides methodological background on 
the risk-based multi-regional interdependency model used to measure the economic 
impacts of a transportation disruption in terms of remaining commodities at suppliers and 
unmet demands at demand nodes. 
Input-output model and its multi-regional extension: the traditional I-O model has 
been extended to represent multi-regional economic interdependency (Miller and Blair 
2009). A regional input-output matrix 𝐀  is developed by modifying the elements of the 
𝐀 matrix. As shown in Eq. (5.2), 𝑙 , referred to as a location quotient, is defined to indicate 
how well industry 𝑘’s production satisfies the regional demand.   
𝑎
𝑙 𝑎 ,    𝑙 < 1
𝑎 ,       𝑙 ≥ 1
 (5.2) 
 
The location quotient, 𝑙 , is mathematically defined in Eq. (5.3), where 𝑥  is the 




output of industry 𝑘 at the national level, and 𝑥  is the output of all industries at the 
national level. 





 As discussed by Isard et al. (1998), in multi-regional analysis, it is desired to 
consider the effects of interdependencies due to the exchange of goods and services 
between regions. The authors extended the input-output model to incorporate inter-
regional commodity exchanges by defining an inter-regional relationship as 𝑧 ′ =
𝑧 ′𝑧 ′, where 𝑧 ′ is the amount of output of industry 𝑘 in region 𝑟 that is used by 
industry ℎ in region 𝑟′, 𝑧 ′ is the amount of output of industry 𝑘 that goes from region 
𝑟 to 𝑟 , and 𝑧 ′is the amount of output of industry ℎ coming from all regions into 𝑟  that 
is used as input by industry ℎ. Isard et al. argued that 𝑧 ′ is proportional to 𝜉 , the total 
amount of commodities related to industry 𝑘 that come into region 𝑟   from all other 
regions (i.e., 𝑧 ′ = 𝜓 ′𝜉 ). Also, 𝑧 ′ is proportional to the output of the industry ℎ 
in region 𝑟′ (i.e., 𝑧 ′ = 𝑎 ′𝑥 ). Hence, the inter-regional technical coefficient is 
defined with Eq. (5.4). 
𝑎 =  
𝑧  𝑧
𝜉   𝑥
= 𝜓 𝑎  (5.4) 
 
Ultimately, an inter-regional input-output model is proposed in Eq. (5.5), the 
details of which can be found in Isard et al. (1998) and Miller and Blair (2009). 




The multi-regional, multi-industry input-output model is provided in Eq. (5.6). 
Each sub-matrix 𝚿  is a 𝐾 × 𝐾 diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the 
proportions of all commodities 𝜓 ′, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} that originated in region 𝑟 and are 
consumed in region 𝑟′.  Each sub-matrix 𝚿 , referred to as the trade coefficient matrix, 
are parametrized using the Commodity Flow Survey database that documents the annual 
flow of goods in US dollars using multi-modal transportation across different regions in 
























Inoperability Input-Output Model and its multi-regional extension: Crowther and 
Haimes (2010) followed the same principles in developing multi-regional input-output 
model to propose the Multi-Regional Inoperability Input-Output Model (MRIIM) by 
integrating Eqs. (5.6) and (2.3). In the MRIIM, provided in Eq. (5.7), each of the 𝐾 × 𝐾 
sub-matrices 𝚿⋆ , ∀ 𝑟, 𝑟′ ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑅} is normalized by the diagonal regional output 

























Total economic losses, the combination of direct and indirect losses, can be 
calculated by multiplying each industry’s production level by its inoperability level: for 
industry 𝑘, 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞 , or for the entire economy of industries, 𝑄 = 𝐱 𝐪.  A multi-




under study. As such, planning decisions can be made with respect to some combination 
of inoperability or economic impact at the industry level, the multi-industry level, or for 
different regions. 
MRIIM Application to Freight Disruption: following a disruption in freight 
transportation infrastructure, commodity movement is assumed to be degraded and the 
whole system of interconnected industries is faced with a failure in the form of remaining 
commodities at suppliers and unmet demands at consumers. The propagation of the 
failure throughout interconnected industries located in multiple region is formulated 
using MRIIM. Santos and Haimes (2004) proposed a demand-reduction IIM that has been 
successfully employed to study multi-industry impacts of perturbations in supply and 
demand (e.g., Resurreccion and Santos (2013), Pant et al. (2011), Haggerty et al. (2008), 
Lian and Haimes (2006)). Here, the failure is translated into the two IIM metrics of 
inoperability and final consumption perturbation based on a demand-reduction MRIIM 
implemented by Pant et al. (2011) in modeling supply and demand perturbation caused 
by an inland waterway port closure. In the proposed approach, the remaining 
commodities at suppliers after a disruption are considered as final consumption 
perturbations. And the effects of the failure at demand nodes in the form of unmet 
demands is modeled as a “forced” demand reduction, assuming that a disruption 
decreases the supply of a commodity for a demand node while the final external 
consumption remains virtually unaffected. In such a case, the demand nodes temporarily 
sacrifice their internal need for that commodity until it returns to its as-planned supply 
level, and a surrogate for supply reduction is calculated from the combination of “forced” 




Modeling Remaining Supply: the remaining commodities at a supplier of 
commodity 𝑘 located in node 𝑖 at region 𝑟 will be considered as a reduction in final 
consumption. Final consumption for industry 𝑘 includes commodities consumed by 
industry 𝑘 itself internally, or (?̂? ) , and the amount of external consumption that is 
exported through the network 𝐺, or (?̂? ) , as modeled in Eq. (5.8). It is assumed that the 
disruption results in losses of commodity flows only through the network, so industry 
production activities unrelated to the network experience no direct failure though might 
be affected indirectly due to an interdependent loss of economic productivity. When a 
disruption causes difficulties for industry 𝑘 in region r only in exporting commodities, it 
experiences commodities remaining at supply nodes in region r totaling ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) , 
where 𝑁  represents the set of nodes that are home to suppliers in region 𝑟. This is  shown 
in Eq. (5.9). As such, the final consumption perturbation for industries that experience 
difficulties only in exporting commodities is modeled as the amount of slack divided by 
as-planned industry output in Eq. (5.10). 
?̂? = (?̂? ) + (?̂? )           𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} (5.8) 
 
?̂? − ?̃? = 𝑆𝑖
 ∈( ∩ )




∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
            𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} (5.10) 
 
Modeling Unmet Demand: as discussed by Pant et al. (2011), the amount of 




contributes toward the production activity and the internal consumption of industry 𝑘 at 
region 𝑟. Thus, when a disruption causes difficulties for industry 𝑘 at region 𝑟 in 
importing commodities, it experiences unmet demands totaling ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) . The 
consequences are the loss of output, ∆𝑥 = 𝑥 − 𝑥 , and final internal 
consumption, ∆(?̂? ) .  
𝑆𝑖
 ∈( ∩ )
= ∆𝑥 + ∆(?̂? )             𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} 
(5.11) 
 
Therefore, for industry 𝑘, unmet demand causes an inoperability, 𝑞 , measured as 
the loss of production in industry 𝑘 as a proportion of its original production level, with 
∆𝑥 𝑥⁄ . Also, a disruption in internal consumption, as shown in Eq. (5.8), causes a final 
consumption perturbation, 𝑐⋆, and is modeled as a measure of the change in the final 
consumption as a proportion of the original production level in industry k, with ∆?̂? 𝑥⁄ . 
The failure in the form of unmet demand is formulated following an approach adapted 
from the port disruption work of Pant et al. (2011, 2015) and the transportation network 
vulnerability formulation of Darayi et al. (2017), in which a slack variable 𝑆  is defined 
to capture unsatisfied demand at demand nodes (or undelivered commodities remaining 
with the suppliers), shown in Eq. (5.12). For the industries experiencing difficulties only 
in importing their required commodities, there exists a final consumption perturbation, as 




∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ ) − ∆𝑥
𝑥






∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
− 𝑞         𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} (5.13) 
 
To quantify the inoperability and final consumption perturbations for the 
collection of 𝐾 interconnected industries located in R regions, a complete solvable system 
of Eqs. (5.10) and (5.13) combined with the MRIIM in Eq. (5.7) is implemented. While 
in actual situations, some industries would likely consist of both supply and demand 
nodes in each region, Eqs. (5.10) and (5.13) capture failure in either only supply nodes or 
only demand nodes within a particular industry at a region. Eq. (5.14) formulates the total 
final consumption perturbation for industry 𝑘 in the case of having both exporting 
(supply) and importing (demand) roles.  
𝑐⋆ =
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
+
∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∈( ∩ )
𝑥
− 𝑞                        𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} (5.14) 
 
As a result, the perturbation vector for region r (𝐜⋆ ), whose elements are captured 
by Eqs. (5.10),  (5.13), or (5.14) depending on the importing/exporting role the nodes 
belonging to each industry in each region, parameterizes the interdependency model in 
Eq. (5.7). And, consequently, regional vector of inoperability 𝐪  consisting of 𝐾 elements 
of inoperability for each industry in region 𝑟 can be calculated. Following a disruptive 
event that causes difficulties for freight movement (and results in remaining commodities 
at suppliers and unmet demands), 𝑞  measures the proportional extent to which as-
planned productivity or functionality is not realized in industry 𝑘 at region 𝑟. Considering 
each industry’s production level in monetary value and calculating the total impact of the 




opportunity to plan for network restoration considering economic impacts, as discussed 
in the next step.  
5.2.3 Step 3: Planning for Restorative Capacity 
When a disruption leads to the loss of multiple network components, regional 
economies and multiple industries that relied on the functionality of the network 
experience inoperability and economic losses. We desire to tackle recovery actions in 
terms of restoration failed network components with multi-industry economic 
productivity in mind. Restorative capacity is considered to be the extent to which a freight 
transportation network is capable of being recovered through the assignment of work 
crews. Based on the static measure of restorative capacity modeled in Eq. (5.1), a time-
based formulation is proposed in Eq. (5.15) that captures the proportional economic loss 
(considering maximum loss in case of no recovery action) that could be avoided at time 
period 𝑡 by the set of recovery actions devised up to 𝑡. 𝑄  represents the summation of 
economic loss in multiple industries located in multiple regions following a disruption, 
and 𝑄  is the economic loss at time 𝑡 considering the proportionally recovered network 
in the meantime. Recall that economic loss for industry 𝑘 at region 𝑟 is calculated by 
multiplying the proportional inoperability, 𝑞  found using Eq. (5.7), by the expected 
production level in monetary units, or 𝑄 = 𝑥 𝑞 . Total economic losses at each time 
period is a summation of 𝑄  over multiple industries in multiple regions for that particular 
period of time. Recovery decisions are made to maximize restorative capacity over 
multiple time periods, formulated in Eq. (5.15). 







A regional restorative capacity measure is proposed in Eq. (5.16) represents the 
economic productivity improvement in region r triggered by restorative decisions up to 
time 𝑡. Likewise, an industry-specific measure of restorative capacity at time 𝑡 is 
formulated in Eq. (5.17). 
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Each node in the transportation network can play the role of a supplier and a 
demand node simultaneously. We do note that no supplier in a region is permitted to 
satisfy demand nodes in that region. To implement that in the model, we connect two 
separated supply and demand dummy nodes to each non-transshipment node with the 
same amount of supply and demand as those amounts which are included in that  
particular node. Note that this expansion on the network turns the non-transition nodes to 
a transition node. We also assume that each industry includes two types of commodities 
and no region supplies a commodity that is also demanded in that region. Notation 
employed in the problem formulation is summarized as follows: 
Sets and indices 
𝑁 Set of nodes 
𝐿 Set of links 
𝑁   Set of supply nodes 
𝑁   Set of demand nodes 
𝑁   Set of transshipment nodes 
𝑁′ Set of disrupted nodes 
𝐿  Set of disrupted links 
𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 Index of discrete time periods, where 𝑇 is the end of the time horizon 




𝛼  Set of commodities belonging to industry 𝑘 
𝑁  Set of supply nodes in industry 𝑘 
𝑁  Set of demand nodes in industry 𝑘 
𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾  
Index of types of commodities in each industry, where 𝐾  is the total 
number of commodities, each industry is made up of two different types of 
commodities  
𝑁  Set of supply nodes in commodity 𝑘  of industry 𝑘 
𝑁  Set of demand nodes in commodity 𝑘  of industry 𝑘 
𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅 Index of regions, where 𝑅 is the total number of regions 
𝑁  Set of supply nodes in the region 𝑟 
𝑁  Set of demand nodes in the region 𝑟 
Parameters 
𝑢  Capacity of link (𝑖, 𝑗) before disruption 
𝜋  Total production of industry 𝑘 in node 𝑖 
𝑏  
Mass-balance parameter representing supply/ demand/transshipment of 
commodity 𝑘  at node 𝑖 after disruption. For supply nodes 𝑏 > 0, for 
demand nodes 𝑏 < 0, and for transshipment nodes 𝑏 = 0 
𝑥  Production level of industry k in region 𝑟 in monetary value 
𝑇∗( × ) 
Element of the normalized multi-regional interdependency matrix 𝑇∗ of size 
(𝐾×𝑅)×(𝐾×𝑅) 
𝛾  
Multiplier of the slack term to represent slack at supply nodes (𝛾 =
1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ), demand nodes (𝛾 = −1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ), and transshipment 
nodes (𝛾 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ) 
Decision variables 
𝑓  
Integer variable representing the flow of commodity 𝑘  of industry 𝑘 across 
link (𝑖, 𝑗) at time 𝑡 after a disruptive event 
𝑆  
Integer slack variable representing undelivered commodity 𝑘  of industry 𝑘 
remaining with the supply node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 or unsatisfied demand of 
commodity 𝑘  of industry 𝑘 at demand node 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝜇  Binary variable equal to 1 when the restoration process of disrupted link 
(𝑖, 𝑗) finishes at time 𝑡, and 0 otherwise 
𝛽  Binary variable equal to 1 when link (𝑖, 𝑗) is operational at time 𝑡, and 0 
otherwise 
ω  
Binary variable equal to 1 if there exists any unsatisfied demand of 
commodities in industry 𝑘 in region 𝑟 at time 𝑡, and 0 otherwise 
𝑐∗  
Continuous variable representing final consumption perturbation for 
industry 𝑘 in region 𝑟 at time 𝑡 
𝑞  
Continuous variable representing inoperability level of industry 𝑘 in region 
𝑟 at time 𝑡 
𝑄  
Continuous variable representing total economic loss of industry 𝑘 in region 





Planning for restorative capacity by recovering the disrupted links in an order 
which leads to the minimum total economic loss over the time horizon is formulated as 
follows.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 Я  
(5.18) 
𝑓 ≤  𝑢 , ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
(5.19) 
𝑓 ≤  𝛽 𝑢 , ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
(5.20) 
𝑓
( , )∈  
− 𝑓
( , )∈  
+ 𝛾 𝑆 =  𝑏 , 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
 
(5.21) 
𝜇 ≤ 1 , ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′ 
(5.22) 
𝛽 ≤ 𝜇 , ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
(5.23) 
𝑐∗ =
∑ ∑ 𝑆 ∈  ∩∈
𝑥
+
∑ ∑ 𝑆 ∈( ∩ )∈
𝑥
− 𝜔 𝑞 ,  






≤ 𝜔 ≤  𝑥 𝑆
∈∈
, 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑅, 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾, 𝑡
= 1, … , 𝑇 
(5.25) 
























𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
(5.27) 
𝛽 = {0,1}, 𝜇 = {0,1}, ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (5.28) 
𝑆 > 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁  , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁  , 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝐾 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (5.29) 
𝑐⋆ > 0, 𝑞 > 0, 𝑄 > 0, 𝜔 = {0,1},






The proposed formulation optimizes the restoration efforts associated with a 
transportation network in the aftermath of a disruptive event. Recall that the network is 
presented by an undirected graph 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐿), with set of nodes 𝑁 and set of links 𝐿. 
Nodes and links affected by a disruption are represented with sets 𝑁′ and 𝐿′, respectively. 
The objective function explores a restoration schedule of disrupted links that leads to the 
maximum proportional reduction in economic losses across the time horizon. Eq. (5.19) 
restricts the total flow of all commodities on each link (𝑖, 𝑗) to at most its pre-disruption 
capacity 𝑢 . After a disruption, the capacity of each disrupted link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′ is reduced 
to zero unless it is completely recovered and becomes operational again, as shown in Eq. 
(5.20). Eq. (5.21) represent the flow balance constraint for all commodities in and out of 
supply, demand, and transshipment nodes. In the aftermath of disruption we maintain the 
flow balance in each node by  defining  ,as the  slack variable 𝑆  which captures: (i) the 
remaining supply of each industry across each supplier, (i.e., 𝑆  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ), (ii) the 
unmet demand of each industry across each demand node , (i.e., 𝑆  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ). Note that 
𝑏  is a positive value for supply nodes, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 , a negative value for demand nodes, 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 , and it is zero for transshipment nodes, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 . Eqs. (5.22) and (5.23) schedule 
disrupted links for restoration. Eq. (5.22) shows that each disrupted link is recovered in 
one time period, and when it is recovered, it should remain operational for the remainder 
of the time horizon, Eq. (5.23). Eq. (5.24) calculates the consumption perturbation of each 
industry 𝑘, remaining in each supplier node, 𝑆  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁  , or each unsatisfied demand 




industry 𝑘 in each region 𝑟, 𝑥 . In Eq. (5.25), ω   activates the impact of inoperability 
of commodities in industry 𝑘 in region 𝑟 at time 𝑡 in Eq. (5.24) only if there exists any 
unsatisfied demand of commodities in industry 𝑘 in that region. Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27) 
calculate the inoperability level and total economic loss of each industry, 𝑘, in each 
region, 𝑟 ,at time, 𝑡, respectively. In Eq. (5.26), 𝑞  is the inoperability matrix, 𝑘×1, ∀𝑘 ∈
𝐾, of all industries in each region 𝑟 which capture the consequences of the existence of 
unsatisfied demand of each industry 𝑘 on the output of that industry which is required to 
be minimized as the result of optimal schedule of disrupted links, Eq. (5.27).  
 
We demonstrate the proposed model on a case study based on a multi-modal 
freight transportation network, consisting of three interstate highways, railways, and 
inland waterway that connect Mississippi River Navigation System through two ports. 
This infrastructure plays a significant role in transporting commodities produced in the 
state of Oklahoma and sent to consumers in neighboring states, and so contrariwise. We 
employ the case study to implement the proposed model and evaluate and analyze the 
restorative efforts from different perspectives, such as, economy loss of each type of 
produced commodity in each region and network resilience behavior within restoration 
horizon. Three disruption scenarios are defined as the complete disruption of four 
different transshipment nodes. Four combined demand/supply nodes are considered in 
surrounding states are connected to three main supply/demand nodes within Oklahoma 




loss in the aftermath of each disruptive scenario determines the optimal schedule of 
disrupted links to be restored with results in maximum economy saving during restoration 
process.  
  5.3.1 Supply-Demand Network  
Figure 5.3 shows the multi-modal freight transportation network, which sends and 
receives flows of different commodities from the industry sectors within the state of 
Oklahoma to the neighboring states and from surrounding states to the state of Oklahoma, 
respectively. The network consists of a part of interstate highways I-35, which connects 
Oklahoma to the north-south corridor, and I-40 and I-44, which is connected through the 
east-west corridor. Part of US highways 169 and 165 within Oklahoma connects the Port 
of Catoosa and the Port of Muskogee to the interstate highway network. Two intermodal 
rail-truck facility, one in Oklahoma City near the junction of I-35 and I-40, and the other 
one in Tulsa Oklahoma, which belongs to Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad, 
are considered in the infrastructure of the network. We also include a part of the US inland 
waterway which connects the connects the Port of Catoosa and the Port of Muskogee to 
the Port of New Orleans, LA (node 5), the Port of Chicago, IL (node 7), the Port of Little 





Figure 5.3. Representations of (a) spatial location of multi-modal nodes in Oklahoma 
and surrounding states, and (b) the connected transportation network. 
 
Based on NAICS, 62 industries operate in each of the five states, therefore 𝐀⋆ 
matrix regionalized for each state is 62 × 62. Although the focus of this work is to study 
the interaction of remained supply/unsatisfied demand and economy loss in the five 
regions, we also are interested in tracking the impacts of disruptions of these five states 
on other states which are not involved in disruption, yet are affected by its consequent 
negative impacts associated with their economy loss. Therefore 𝐀⋆ matrix is 620 × 620 
involved in network disruption and five affected regions by marginal disruption effects. 
We consider six primary industries export and import commodities through each five 
states. Discussed previously, it is assumed that two types of commodities belong to each 
industry as defined by NAICS economic sectors, and each node within the network is 
considered to be home to both suppliers or consumers of multiple commodities or 
transship the flow without adding or reducing any amount of flow. Based on the combined 




compiled from different databases (US Army Corps of Engineers 2013, Tulsa Port of 
Catoosa 2013, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2010a,b, Port of Muskogee 2013, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010), a list of monthly supply and demand is presented in 
Table 5.2 (assuming constant monthly demand, or annual demand divided by 12). 
Table 5.1. Economic losses, in million USD, within the state of Oklahoma after 
planning for adaptive capacity. 
  Industry 
  





Oklahoma City (1) 362526 0 300501 183188 23790 118242 
Port of Catoosa (2) 50244 454911 284685 25268 2470 424 
Port of Muskogee (3) 0 33962 0 31886 0 30021 
Texas (4) 23250 0 21750 0 0 577 
Louisiana (5) 993 3828 36528 0 7174 0 
Arkansas (6) 0 0 60000 635 17000 1100 





Oklahoma City (1) 23250 0 60000 0 17000 1100 
Port of Catoosa (2) 1064 3828 36976 635 7174 577 
Port of Muskogee (3) 285 0 21750 0 70000 0 
Texas (4) 97281 316905 204006 0 25838 30154 
Louisiana (5) 50244 18449 0 0 267 0 
Arkansas (6) 265245 153518 381180 41038 156 54494 







  5.3.2 Freight Movement and Disruption  
To parametrize the MCNF model, the cost vector is computed based on the 
transportation mode and the mileage of the distances between nodes: the per ton-mile for 
a barge is estimated at $0.97, compared to $2.53 for rail, and $5.35 for trucking (Arkansas 
Waterway Commissions 2014). Assuming that the total supply of commodity 𝑘 is equal 
to the total demand of the same commodity throughout the network, as shown in Table 
5.2, a baseline flow resulted in no remaining commodities at supply nodes and no 
unsatisfied demand at demand nodes when there is no disruption to the functionality of 
the network. 
In the illustrative example, disruption scenarios are defined as the removal of three 
network components, (i.e., nodes), at a time. It is assumed that a disruption, or the removal 
of a particular network component, lasts for a period of one month. Assuming that annual 
industry production accumulates consistently across the year (i.e., neither production nor 
interdependency relationships vary day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month), a 
smaller month-long time horizon is considered here as an appropriate proportion of a year 
to calculate the particular disruptive event cascading effect (e.g., a two-week closure of 
port facilities (Pant et al. 2011)). Focusing on the economy each of four states, and 
considering supply nodes within each state interacting with demand nodes in surrounding 
states, undelivered commodities remaining with suppliers or unsatisfied demand at 
demand nodes, as represented by 𝑆 , affect industry output and result in propagated 
inoperability through many of the interconnected industries. In the illustrative example, 
shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, three disruption scenarios are defined as the removal 




the first scenario nodes 10, 9, 11 and the transmission node associated with node 7 are 
disrupted. The second scenario considers nodes 8, 9, 11 and the transmission node 
associated with node 4. The third scenario disables nodes 10, 8, 11 and the transmission 
node related to node 1. We assume that a disrupted node disconnects all its related links 
completely.   
In the illustrative example, three supply/demand nodes are within the state of 
Oklahoma and the four supply/demand nodes are located in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and Illinois. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 report ∑ ∑ 𝑆 ∈  ∩∈ ,  or the sum of the 
slack (remaining supply) by commodity at the supply nodes when different network 
components are disrupted, and ∑ ∑ 𝑆 ∈( ∩ )∈ , the sum of the slack (unsatisfied 
demand) by commodities at the demand nodes when different network components are 
disrupted, respectively, omitting the flow on the disrupted component from the baseline 
flow within the network. As shown in Table 5.3, the Petroleum and coal industry (324) 
is directly vulnerable in all disruption scenarios except for the loss of link (1,7), while the 











Table 5.2. Tons of remaining commodities at suppliers with the removal of 
network components. 
Disruption Scenario Region 
Sum of remaining commodities at supply nodes (tons) 
311 324 325 327 333 339 
Scenario 1 
Oklahoma 412770 488873 585187 240342 26262 148687 
Texas 23250 0 21750 0 0 577 
Louisiana 993 3828 36528 0 7174 0 
Arkansas 0 0 60000 635 17000 1100 
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scenario 2 
Oklahoma 362526 448612 382487 240342 26262 138687 
Texas 23250 0 21750 0 0 577 
Louisiana 993 3828 36528 0 7174 0 
Arkansas 0 0 60000 635 17000 1100 
Illinois 356 0 448 0 70000 0 
Scenario 3 
Oklahoma 412770 454911 585187 208456 26262 118666 
Texas 23250 0 21750 0 0 577 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.3. Tons of unmet demands at demand nodes with the removal of network 
components. 
Disruption Scenario Region 
Sum of unsatisfied commodities at demand nodes (tons) 
311 324 325 327 333 339 
Scenario 1 
Oklahoma 24599 3828 118726 635 94174 1677 
Texas 97281 316906 204006 0 25838 30154 
Louisiana 50244 18450 0 0 267 0 
Arkansas 265245 153518 381180 41038 156 54494 
Illinois 0 0 0 199304 0 0 
Scenario 2 
Oklahoma 24599 3828 118726 635 94174 1677 
Texas 97281 316906 204006 0 25838 30154 
Louisiana 50244 18450 0 0 267 0 
Arkansas 265245 153518 381180 41038 156 54494 
Illinois 0 0 0 199304 0 64039 
Scenario 3 
Oklahoma 24599 3828 118726 635 24174 1677 
Texas 97281 316906 204006 0 25838 30154 
Louisiana 50244 18450 0 0 267 0 
Arkansas 265245 119556 381180 9152 0 24473 




As each of four states includes supply and demand nodes, failure in the form of 
the inability of suppliers to export commodities/demands to receive commodities is 
modeled as a inoperability perturbation. Other industries within each of the four states as 
well as other states, which is not involved in disrupted network directly, will be affected 
by interdependent effect of this failure, as captured by 𝑞  in matrix 𝑞  for each region in 
Eq. (5.7), representing the extent to which an industry output will not be products, or an 
industry input will not be received. The effect of the disruption on the economy loss of 
each state is captured by 𝑄 .  
Given the remaining commodities left at supply nodes and unsatisfied demands 
in demand nodes, shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively, inoperability 
perturbation is calculated with Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27) and depicted in Table 5.5. The 
Machinery industry (333) is the most vulnerable in the presence of each three disruptive 
scenarios. Each these disruptive scenarios also affects the operability of the 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industry (339), yet in lesser extent than industry (333).  The 
operability level in Arkansas is dependent on the connectivity of transshipment nodes 9 
and 11 to the rest of the network. 
Table 5.4 represents a detailed report of the maximum economic loss in the 
aftermath of each disruption scenarios. Each column is associated with one disruption 
scenario and includes: (i) the total economic loss resulted from each disruption scenario, 
(ii) the maximum economic loss related to each state and each industry, (iii) the last 
column presents a detailed report of the maximum economic loss related to each industry 




should be recovered are made based on the impacts on the total economy, as shown in 
Figure 5.4. And, Figures 5.5-5.10 present regional and industry-based impacts of the 
recovery decisions.  
Table 5.4. Economic losses, in million USD, within the state of Oklahoma after 
planning for adaptive capacity. 
Formulation Region Industry 
𝑄  
Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
Total economic loss 
𝑄  
 14707.40 12711.9 13340.7 
The economic loss for each 
region 
𝑄  
Oklahoma 558.49 494.58 631.12 
Texas 1218.60 1199.37 530.33 
Louisiana 262.51 236.42 244.68 
Arkansas 6917.85 5832.27 129.17 
 Illinois 5749.97 4949.30 6065.67 
The economic loss for each 
industry 
𝑄  
 311 716.28 633.01 1737.92 
 324 606.02 519.83 419.01 
 325 276.26 242.88 1105.74 
 327 148.63 132.16 178.27 
 333 6659.87 5761.98 6532.99 
 339 1866.38 1586.53 5104.71 
Inoperability 
Oklahoma 
311 0.00546 0.00494 0.00322 
324 0.04501 0.04487 0.00090 
325 0.00210 0.00187 0.00145 
327 0.01148 0.01051 0.00592 
333 0.00252 0.00336 0.00000 
339 0.01135 0.00967 0.01016 
Texas  
311 0.00436 0.00467 0.00399 
324 0.00022 0.00049 0.00020 
325 0.00151 0.00158 0.00138 
327 0.00234 0.00391 0.00214 
333 0.04866 0.04738 0.04407 
339 0.00556 0.00540 0.00506 
Louisiana 
311 0.00188 0.00182 0.00048 
324 0.00019 0.00018 0.00005 
325 0.00283 0.00248 0.00241 
327 0.00326 0.00322 0.00054 
333 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
339 0.00302 0.00260 0.00258 
Arkansas 
311 0.06400 0.05389 0.06038 




325 0.01482 0.01253 0.01396 
327 0.04483 0.03777 0.04226 
333 0.42954 0.36238 0.40553 
339 0.10744 0.09039 0.10184 
Illinois  
 
311 0.00441 0.00382 0.00404 
324 0.00030 0.00027 0.00028 
325 0.00149 0.00129 0.00133 
327 0.00288 0.00254 0.00257 
333 0.07121 0.06123 0.06244 
339 0.00521 0.00444 0.00475 
 
 




Figure 5.5. (a) Proportional economic saving for each industry, (b) Proportional 







Figure 5.6. (a) Proportional economic saving for each industry, (b) Proportional 





Figure 5.7. (a) Proportional economic saving for each industry, (b) Proportional 















Figure 5.8. The inoperability level of each industry in: (a) Arkansas, (b) Illinois, (c) 
























































Figure 5.9. The inoperability level of each industry in: (a) Arkansas, (b) Illinois, (c) 











Figure 5.10. The inoperability level of each industry in: (a) Arkansas, (b) Illinois, (c) 








The overriding theme of this dissertation is to study the freight transportation 
resilience considering economic impacts. Resilience has been defined based on the three 
aspects of the resilience capacity proposed by Vugrin and Camphouse (2011): (i) 
absorptive capacity, or to the extent a network is able absorb shocks from disruptive 
event, (ii) adaptive capacity, or the extent to which a system can quickly adapt after a 
disruption by temporary means, and (iii) restorative capacity, or the extent to which the 
system can recover from a disruption or be reconstructed in the long-term. Also, It is 
sought to measure the network vulnerability by considering the multi-regional, multi-
industry impacts of a disruption within a freight transportation network.  
In the first step, an integrated framework is developed to measure the economic 
impacts of a disruption within a multi-modal freight transportation network using a 
typical multi-commodity network flow formulation and an economic interdependency 
model. And, a measure of transportation network vulnerability is proposed to analyze a 
broader perspective on freight transportation network vulnerability with a means to 
measure importance of network components considering economic impacts of 
degradation of transportation network. The primary contribution of this approach is the 
integration of the multi-commodity network flow representation of the multi-modal 
transportation network with the interdependent, multi-industry economic model and a 
framework to measure a transportation network component importance considering its 




the state of Oklahoma is considered to illustrate the developed vulnerability analysis 
paradigm.  
In the second step, focusing on the first component of resilient capacity of a 
system, it is sought to lessen the effects of disruptions by investing in hardening both the 
infrastructure (e.g., backup equipment) and industry sectors. The interdependent nature 
of industries has been considered in resource allocation. And, a modeling and analysis 
framework to allocate limited resources to harden industry sectors to enhance the 
absorptive capacity of the total economy is developed. The interdependent adverse effects 
of a disruption are measured using a risk-based interdependency model and an 
exponential resource allocation model is introduced to formulate the risk reduction. 
Finally, proposing an integrated optimization model, it is sought how a limited budget 
could be allocated to multiple industries to enhance the whole interdependent system’s 
economic resilience. A risked-based economic interdependency model is used to measure 
the propagation of a failure through industries. Sources of uncertainty in this data-driven 
model are considered, and a soft-robust optimization model is proposed to devise budget 
allocation under uncertainty. The approach is illustrated with an inland waterway port 
case study.  
In the third step, adaptive capacity is emphasized and contingent rerouting 
strategies are discussed to manage the supply-demand network after a disruptive event to 
lessen the total economic impact. An optimization formulation is proposed to 
accommodate the flow through the residual network and maintain the productivity of the 
economy of the desired region by (i) integrating a multi-commodity network flow model, 




interdependency model, to capture the propagation of the failure in a group of 
interconnected industries, and (ii) defining a measure of adaptive capacity to valuate 
rerouting strategies. Results suggest a successful avoidance of maximum potential loss in 
high dollar industries such as Petroleum and coal products (324) and Miscellaneous 
manufacturing (339), and a consequent static resilience in the economy of the state, as 
the average maximum loss could be avoided by more than 50%.  
Finally, network resilience enhancement considering economic impacts via 
restorative capacity is discussed. Freight Infrastructure as a means to promote economic 
productivity is considered, and an infrastructure network recovery optimization via 
demand satisfaction or network connectivity accounting for multi-industry economic 
impacts is proposed. The focus is on measuring the effectiveness of restorative capacity 
on economic productivity with the proportional value of the maximum loss that can be 
avoided by recovery decisions. And, regional and industry-based economic impacts of 
recovery decisions are analyzed. It is shown that multi-regional, multi industry 
perspective changes the resilience decisions considering total economic productivity 
though it might not be of benefit to all the regions/industries. 
The methods developed in this dissertation can be employed and expanded in 
several directions. Some of them are discussed below. 
The vulnerability analysis perspective proposed in this study can be implemented 
to highlight priorities in maintaining certain network components (to reduce common-
cause failure), or in rerouting of commodity flows after a disruption. There also exists an 




completion strategies where capacity enhancement (e.g., link capacity) and additional 
transportation facilities (e.g., added links/nodes) could harden the network around the 
most vulnerable components. Further, longer term transportation infrastructure design 
plans could be informed by this kind of analysis. Also, the proposed model for absorptive 
capacity can be implemented in a network of freight infrastructure.   
This initial formulation proposed to plan for adaptive capacity can be further 
improved by accounting for the real-world intermodal container planning considerations 
and other dynamic issues. Complementary models to plan for system resilience as a 
function of absorptive and restorative capacity, as well as the adaptive capacity-focused 
formulation proposed here, could more effectively highlight the tradeoffs among different 
resilience capacity planning perspectives.  
In the proposed network recovery model, it is assumed that recovery time is equal 
for all disrupted components and it is just possible to recover one link at a time period. 
The model can be improved by considering proportional recovery and scheduling crews 
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